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The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source 
research organization of the U.S. Army. It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that 
brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics 
derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special 
insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives 
of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered. 
 
 
 
Editors’ Background 
 
Byron Ramirez is a political economy analyst who specializes in international political and 
economic affairs.  He is a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics and Political Science at Claremont 
Graduate University and holds an M.A. in Economics, a M.S. in Management, and an MBA. He 
is presently an intern with Small Wars Journal—El Centro. His areas of research include 
geopolitics, globalization, economic and social development, and informal economies. His most 
recent publication is the co-edited work Narco Armor: Improvised Armored Fighting Vehicles 
in Mexico. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office. 
 
Dr. Robert J. Bunker is Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is also adjunct faculty, Division of Politics and 
Economics (SPE), Claremont Graduate University and a senior fellow with Small Wars Journal— 
El Centro. His many publications (over 200) include books, reports, articles, essays, response 
guidance, subject bibliographies, and encyclopedia entries in academic, policy, military, and law 
enforcement publications; he has also served as the editor for a number of collections of articles. 
Among those are (with Steve Sloan) Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training (Oklahoma 
University Press 2011) and the edited works including Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the 
Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War (Routledge 2012); Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, 
Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge 2011); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (Routledge 
2008); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgencies (Routledge 2005); and Non-State Threats 
and Future Wars (Routledge 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FMSO has provided some formatting to this paper to conform to organizational standards. 
Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author(s). 
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official policy or position 
of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. 
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PREFACE 
 
Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret) 
 
Admiral Stavridis served as Commander of US Southern Command 2006-2009 and was Supreme 
Allied Commander at NATO 2009-2013.  He is currently serving as the 12th Dean of The 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. 
 
May 2014 
 
Narcotics are moving at sea in relatively sophisticated nautical craft beneath the waves – we need 
to understand their capabilities and intent.  This volume is a fine start. 
 
For several decades, law enforcement agencies and the militaries in the Western hemisphere have 
focused on developing strategies that will allow them to thwart the efforts of drug trafficking 
organizations and mitigate the flow of drugs into our great nation. 
 
In close partnership with its allies, the United States has acquired a rich store of experience in 
activities aimed at disrupting the activities of criminal organizations.  In spite of the success of 
Operation Martillo targeting illicit trafficking routes in coastal waters along the Central American 
isthmus, the flow of illicit drugs into the United States continues at a high level. 
 
Just over 20 years ago, narco-submarines emerged as an alternative method of transporting 
narcotics. This study is important and relevant to the present challenges faced by law enforcement 
authorities and militaries as it specifically focuses on these specially fabricated vessels that have 
been used for drug smuggling purposes. 
 
This effort adds value to the existing literature on the subject as it contains several essays which 
describe the complexity of the challenges that narco-submarines present.  The document also 
provides the background and context behind the emergence of these vessels.  Furthermore, the 
work illustrates the evolution of narco-submarine technology and the advances in their design, 
features, and technical capabilities. 
 
Another important contribution of this paper is the extensive and comprehensive photo gallery, 
arranged in chronological order, which allows the reader to observe the evolution of narco- 
submarine technologies. 
 
While this is a volume that will be of general interest to anyone with an interest in global security, 
the intended readers are military, homeland security, and law enforcement personnel who wish to 
learn more about these vessels and their respective capabilities.  Policymakers and analysts may 
also find the work useful for understanding the detection and interdiction challenges that these 
vessels generate. 
 
Finally, it is important that we collectively consider the potential of these types of vessels to 
transport more than just narcotics: the movement of cash, weapons, violent extremists, or, at the 
darkest end of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction. 
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This paper, by increasing the area of knowledge about narco-submarines, should enrich and deepen 
our understanding of the threat they pose to our domestic security, and indeed to the global 
commons. 
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EDITORS’ NOTE 
 
Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker 
 
 
May 2014 
 
 
This paper is intended to be an initial primer on the subject of narco-submarines, that is, those 
specially fabricated vessels utilized principally by Colombian narco traffickers and developed to 
smuggle cocaine into the U.S. illicit drug market. The work falls within the Foreign Military 
Studies Office (FMSO) mandate of unclassified research conducted on defense and security issues 
that are understudied or under-considered. As a result, this venue was chosen to distribute the 
information it contains and is meant to be a follow up on to the earlier collaborative effort  Narco 
Armor: Improvised Armored Fighting Vehicles in Mexico published by FMSO. 
 
A couple of short comments will be provided in the Editors’ Note to offer some context and 
background for the reader on this topical issue and to help them become better informed on this 
subject matter. 
 
Cocaine smuggling from the Andean region of South America to the United States generates yearly 
revenues in the high tens of billions of dollars (e.g. 2008 UN estimate of USD $88 billion retail) 
and over the last thirty-five years has produced in the low trillions of dollars in retail sales. The 
use of narco-subs and related vessels represents one component of a broader illicit distribution 
strategy that also relies upon go-fast boats, airplanes, the hiding of narcotics inside bulk containers 
and smaller commodities, drug mules, and other techniques to covertly get this high value product 
into the U.S. The main global flows of cocaine into the U.S. and other destinations can be viewed 
in the 2010 UNODC World Drug Report 2010 [1]: 
 
 
 
In fact, as of June 2012, maritime drug smuggling accounts for 80% of the total illicit flow from 
the Andean region into Honduras, Mexico and other mid-way transportation regions prior to entry 
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into the U.S. [2]. About 30% of the maritime flow is estimated by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) to utilize narco submarines [3]. Overall, however, maritime interdiction 
rates are very low. In March 2014, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command testified to 
Congress that: 
 
“Last year, we had to cancel more than 200 very effective engagement activities 
and numerous multilateral exercises, Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly told 
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
 
And because of asset shortfalls, Southcom is unable to pursue 74 percent of 
suspected maritime drug trafficking, the general said. 
 
“I simply sit and watch it go by,” he continued. “And because of service cuts, I 
don’t expect to get any immediate relief, in terms of assets, to work with in this 
region of the world.” [4]. 
 
As a result, it can be seen that narco-submarines and related maritime drug trafficking methods are 
being carried out with relative impunity, with only about 1 in 4 craft presently being interdicted. 
 
Given this context concerning the immense values associated with the cocaine trade to the U.S. 
and the large amount of these illicit drugs not being interdicted during the initial leg in their journey 
to the United States, we now turn our attention to the paper which focuses on these specially 
fabricated vessels themselves. The work contains, in addition to this note, a preface, introduction, 
and a number of short essays discussing and analyzing narco-submarines. The majority of the work 
is then comprised of a picture gallery containing over 30 distinct narco-subs that have been 
identified. It also contains a map and a table that highlights where these distinct narco subs were 
interdicted, an appendix, endnotes, a reference listing, and, finally, biographies of the contributors 
to the work. 
 
It should be noted that, in addition to this paper, it is recommended that a number of highly 
informative videos on this subject matter be viewed as supporting audio-visual material. They are 
as follows: 
 
•   Go  Inside  a  Drug  Submarine  With  the  Narco  Sub  Godfather.  Run  time:  27:42 
minutes. Original air date: July 4, 2010. Motherboard. 
 
•   Cocaine  Sub  Hunt.  Run  time:  50:00  minutes.  Original  air  date:  June  28,  2011. 
National Geographic Channel. 
 
•   Inside  Cocaine  Wars:  Narco  Sub  Mystery.  1  Season  2013.  Run  time:  45:57 
minutes. Original air date: April 7, 2013. National Geographic Channel. 
 
Of course, additional narco-submarine audio-visual resources in both English and Spanish exist 
on the web in short news clips and related postings. For readers who wish to do even more research 
on this topic, a listing of very useful narco-submarine essays and videos can be found in the 
references section of this paper. 
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The editors would like to thank Steven Dudley and Dave Dilegge for their support in this important 
project, and the contributors to this work—Adam Elkus, Javier Guerrero Castro, Mark F. Morris, 
James G. Stavridis, and Hannah Stone —for their past and present work on this topic. This paper 
would not have been possible without the cooperation of the online sites InSight Crime 
(insightcrime.org) and Small Wars Journal—El Centro (smallwarsjournal.com) which have 
provided reprint permission for their writings. In addition, many of the images found in the picture 
gallery were drawn from numerous OSINT sources, including Covert Shores 
(covertshores.blogspot.com) and other online news and governmental websites, numerous images 
were also provided by Captain Mark F. Morris, and all were then fused together and expanded to 
create a meta image gallery for this publication. Finally, we would like to thank the Foreign 
Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, for its support in publishing this document 
and seeing its value vis-à-vis our need to better understand all elements of the ongoing criminal 
insurgencies in Mexico and other regions of Latin America. 
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INTRODUCTION: NARCO-SUBMARINES 
 
Robert J. Bunker and Byron Ramirez 
 
 
May 2014 
 
 
Drug cartels today are much more organized, adaptive, and strategic.  Over time, they have 
acquired vast financial resources that allow them to invest in technologies geared towards 
providing them with a strategic edge. Drug cartels have learned to adapt to a changing environment 
where law enforcement authorities and militaries are also seeking to find their own effective ways 
of disrupting the flow of illicit drugs.  Technology has become a source of competitive advantage 
and both drug cartels and militaries have been investing in engineering and technological tools that 
will allow them to counteract one another. 
 
On one side, drug cartels attempt to optimize their operational efficiency while mitigating the risk 
of detection, seizure, and capture.  On the other side, we have law enforcement and militaries’ 
efforts to improve their surveillance and detection capabilities.  This race to out-flank and 
counteract one another has led to the development of narco-submarines. 
 
During the past twenty years, Colombia’s various drug cartels have engaged in investing in and 
developing narco-submarine technology that will yield a competitive edge. Over time, their 
increasing need to evade capture and confiscation of narcotics led drug cartels to move away from 
using go-fast boats and planes, and instead turn towards developing in-house, homemade, custom 
built narco-submarines. 
 
A narco-submarine (also called narco-sub) is a custom-made, self-propelled vessel built by drug 
traffickers to smuggle their goods. Over the years, their engineering, design and technology have 
improved, thus making them more difficult to detect and capture.  Moreover, from a cost-benefit 
perspective, the yielded benefits are far superior to the associated costs of building these vessels. 
 
Although militaries and law enforcement agencies have become progressively collaborative in 
their efforts to reduce the flows of narcotics, the use of narco-submarines enables narcotics to 
continue to reach their destinations while reducing the probability of detection. Albeit, there have 
been some confiscations of narco-submarine vessels over the last several years.   These 
appropriations in turn have led to our understanding of how narco-submarines are designed, 
engineered, and used to deploy narcotics. 
 
Narco-subs can be generally divided into three categories: Low Profile Vessels (LPV) / Self- 
Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS), Submersibles / Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV), and Narco 
Torpedoes (the towed variety). The third and fourth essays in this paper will fully discuss these 
categories of vessels – thus, for this introduction our interest is to focus on the actual numbers and 
estimates concerning these cocaine smuggling craft and related issues. 
 
However, before providing this information, a fourth type of smuggling vessel Static Narco 
Containers / Torpedoes (aka Parasitic Devices), should be quickly mentioned. These containers 
which are conceptually and functionally related to narco-subs—though passive in nature—are 
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bolted or magnetically placed on the bottom of freighters and other large cargo ships by cartel and 
organized crime frogmen. They hitch a ride from South American ports (Colombian and possibly 
others) into ports in Mexico and the United States, and now it also appears that they are being 
transported into Europe, where cartel divers in the receiving port recover the illicit narcotics that 
they contain. While these containers are outside of the topical focus of this paper, a couple of 
pictures of them will be provided below for informational purposes and to provide context for the 
reader concerning a drug smuggling technology related to that of narco-subs. 
 
 
 
Example of a bolt on static container used to smuggle cocaine on the underside of a cargo ship. 
Provided by U.S. ICE/DHS; Undated Photo (pre-March 2011) [1] 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/28/AR2011022801199.html. 
 
 
 
In May 2014, drugs were found beneath a ship which had sailed from Colombia to Scotland. Police 
discovered 108 kg of narcotics in the rudder area of Cape Maria, moored 2.8 miles from Largs, 
North Ayrshire.   National Crime Agency authorities also seized diving equipment, a rigid 
inflatable boat and an underwater scooter. The ship had been waiting to berth at Hunterston 
terminal when officers from Police Scotland and the Border Force moved in. Dutch authorities 
were also involved in the operation. [2] 
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April 2013 interdiction of narco torpedo (left bottom corner) attached to a cargo ship in 
Rotterdam port. The device contained 101kg of cocaine with an estimated street value of up to 7 
million euros [3]. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/10021140/Narco-torpedoes- 
and-frogmen-drug-smuggling-ring-busted-in-Rotterdam.html. 
 
 
 
Governmental Numbers (and Estimates) 
 
When viewing governmental narco-submarine numbers and estimates, the OSINT information is 
fragmentary at best due to its sensitive nature. Thirty-six estuary and open sea Colombian 
interdictions of semi-submersibles are said to have taken place between 1993 and 2009 per Captain 
Mario Rodriguez, Commander of the Pacific Coast Guard [4]. This is very much in contrast to 
these 2011 Colombian figures: 
 
Colombian officials have seized 63 submersible and semi-submersible submarines 
since 1993. 
 
“We have developed systems that allow us to detect the [submarines],” Adm. 
Álvaro Echandía, the former National Army Commander, said last month. “In 
2009, we captured 20; in 2010, six and so far this year [we have] eight” [5]. 
 
These are slightly less than these somewhat later 2011 figures — “Since 1993 authorities have 
seized 66 semi-submersibles used to smuggle drugs, including seven in 2011, according to the 
Colombian navy” [6]. 
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To these above figures more detailed Colombian interdiction information provided concerning 
seizures to 2012 in a National Geographic documentary yields the following statistics: 
 
• 2 vessels found near the Gulf of Uraba 
• 5 vessels found near Buenaventura 
• 10 vessels found near Sanquianga National Park 
• 10 crews in vessels captured at sea [7]. 
 
It is unclear, however, if a few submersible estuary (prior to launch) seizures have not in fact been 
counted in both the 2009 and 2012 information provided. Still, the Colombian figures suggest their 
interdiction numbers range from about thirty narco-subs to well into the sixties. 
 
From the U.S. side, per the testimony of Rear Admiral Charles Michel, JIATF-South Director, in 
June 2012, the following statistics pertaining maritime contact numbers and interdictions are 
provided: 
 
JIATF-South detected an SPSS [Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles] at sea for the 
first time in 2006. By 2009, the interagency detected as many as 60 SPSS events 
were moving as much as 330 metric tons per year. Prior to 2011, SPSS had only 
been employed by traffickers in the Eastern Pacific. However, since July 2011, 
JIATF-South has supported the disruption of five SPSS vessels in the Western 
Caribbean, each carrying more than 6.5 metric tons of cocaine. 
 
There have been a total of 214 documented SPSS events, but only 45 were disrupted 
due largely to the difficulty of detecting such low-profile vessels [8]. 
 
It is unknown how the thirty to sixty something Colombian interdictions relate to the forty-five 
JIATF-South interdictions concerning overlapping incidents and how semi-submersibles vis-à-vis 
true submersible interdictions are presented in these figures. 
 
The numbers of these vessels which now exists is also highly debatable with potentially dozens of 
them being produced every year by criminal organizations in Colombia such as the FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), Rastrojos, and Urabeños [9] [10]. One point greatly 
influencing the numbers of these vessels which exist at any specific time is if they are utilized once 
and then scuttled after their delivery (the traditional U.S. military viewpoint) or if they are utilized 
multiple times (the traditional Colombian military viewpoint). Depending on the perspective held, 
greater or lesser numbers of narco subs would be required to be produced each year to replenish 
the vessels lost due to capture, accidental sinking, intentional-scuttling to avoid capture, and, 
potentially most importantly, at the end of a delivery run. 
 
What is known is that the capability of these vessels has grown over the last two decades with their 
evolution and, if the Colombian cartels’ dream of making the journey (using fully submersible 
narco-subs) to West Africa and Europe is realized, such subs would very well represent a valuable 
cross Atlantic trafficking resource that would not likely be scuttled at the end of such a profitable 
illicit trade route [11] [12]. 
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Vigo Submarine 
 
In August 2006, Spanish authorities seized a narco submarine off Spain’s Atlantic coast, near Vigo. 
According to reports, the traffickers were followed by Spanish authorities for months. Once 
authorities had gathered enough evidence and received information that a shipment of cocaine 
from South America was about to arrive, they proceeded to make the arrests and confiscate the 
vessel. 
 
The narco-submarine was intended to serve as a ferry vessel that would have met a larger vessel 
in mid sea. The failed plan intended for the traffickers to transfer a load of 6,000 kilos of cocaine 
into the narco-submarine and then bring it to shore. The narco-submarine was carrying 4,400 liters 
of fuel when seized which suggests that it had the extended range to deliver the illicit product to 
other European shorelines.  Authorities indicate that the arrested were Spanish traffickers who 
were working alongside a South American drug cartel [13] [14]. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.farodevigo.es/sucesos/2008/03/13/red-narcosubmarino-vigo-preparaba-alijo-6000- 
kilos-coca/207700.html 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.farodevigo.es/sucesos/2011/01/11/red-narcosubmarino-abandonado-ria-vigo- 
enfrenta-121-anos-carcel/507645.html 
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Analysis Based on the Picture Gallery (Interdiction Data Set) 
 
Based on visual evidence derived from the picture gallery, we have in essence amassed an 
interdiction data set.   The picture gallery presented later in this paper specifies the individual 
vessel’s date and location of interdiction. Based on our research, a total of 33 specific vessels have 
been identified with several other vessels whose date and location of interdiction cannot be 
determined. 
 
Exhibits 1 through 4 below show interdictions recorded during the past several years.  Although 
some reports suggest that more vessels have been captured over the years, without specifying a 
number, the physical visual evidence (picture gallery) assembled using several sources has yielded 
the data represented in the figures that follow. 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
 
Narco Vesselsʼ Interdictions 
 
6 
5 
5 
4 4 
4 
3 3 
3 
2 
2 
1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 
 
 
 
Semi-Submersible Submersible LPVs 
 
 
Exhibit 1 shows the number of narco vessel interdictions per year (between the period 1993 thru 
2013) by vessel type (LPV; Semi-Submersible; and Submersible).  Source: Editors’ calculation 
 
In recent years, there have been more interdictions while drug cartels continue to increase their use 
of narco vessels.  Our data set shows 33 distinct narco vessels (see picture gallery) that have been 
seized.  The majority of the seized vessels are LPVs (Low Profile Vessels) which represent 22 of 
the 33 vessels in our sample.  The second highest number of interdictions (10) falls under the 
Submersibles category. 
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Exhibit 2 
 
 
Seized Narco Vessels 
 
8 
 
7 
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5 
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3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
 
Narco Vessels   Linear (Narco Vessels) 
 
 
Exhibit 2 illustrates the increase (upward trend) in the number of total seized narco vessels during 
the past 20 years (1993 thru 2013).  Source: Editors’ calculation 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3 
 
 
Seized Vessels (1993-2013) 
 
Semi-Submersible Submersible LPVs 
 
 
 
 
Submersible 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi- 
Submersible 
1 
LPVs 
22 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3 shows a visual proportional break-down of seized narco vessels (by vessel type) during 
the last 20 years.  Source: Editors’ calculation 
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Exhibit 4 
 
INTERDICTIONS TABLE 
 
Type 
Year 
Semi- 
Submersible 
 
Submersible 
 
LPVs 
 
Total 
1993 1   1 
1994  1  1 
1995  1 1 2 
1996    0 
1997    0 
1998    0 
1999    0 
2000  1  1 
2001    0 
2002    0 
2003    0 
2004    0 
2005  1  1 
2006   3 3 
2007   4 4 
2008  1 4 5 
2009   3 3 
2010  1 1 2 
2011  2 5 7 
2012  1  1 
2013  1 1 2 
Total 1 10 22 33 
 
 
Exhibit 4 is an interdiction table which shows the total number of narco submarine vessels (by 
vessel type) interdicted each year between the years 1993 and 2013.  Source: Editors’ calculation 
 
The interdiction table above suggests that, since 2006, there has been a clear increase in the number 
of interdictions.  This hints that the cartels just before and around 2006 may have started using 
narco vessels with greater frequency.  Perhaps more vessels were interdicted in recent years due 
to the greater number of vessels that authorities came across. Moreover, the data seems to propose 
that cartels have been using different types of narco-submarines concurrently; hence, they seem to 
be employing a mixed strategy. 
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The following cost-benefit analysis table (Exhibit 5) has been prepared by the editors using sources 
that reveal approximate financial figures. 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Vessel Category Description Cost of Manufacturing Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Semi-submersibles 
 
These vessels are 
capable of ballasting 
down to lower their 
surface profile and 
controlling their 
running depth, but 
cannot fully submerge. 
 
It is estimated that the cost 
of building these was 
approximately $1 Million 
USD. 
 
Can control running 
depth and direction. 
Capable of carrying 
2 tons of narcotics 
(worth around $40 
Million USD). 
 
Can be detected 
rather easily relative 
to LPVs and 
submarines as they 
cannot submerge 
fully. 
 
Submersible: 
Submarine 
 
Submarine with self- 
propulsion capability 
and ability to 
submerge fully under 
water. Equipped with 
advanced radar, GPS, 
navigational 
technology. Invisible 
on radar and infrared 
when below the 
surface. 
 
Approx. $2 to 4 Million 
USD 
 
Can travel at a speed 
of 11 mph for a 
distance of 2,000 
miles (3,200 km) 
while carrying 10 
tons of narcotics 
(worth around $200 
Million USD). 
Almost undetectable 
as they are capable 
of diving 30 feet 
under the surface. 
 
Most expensive to 
design, develop and 
build. Take some 
time to build, 
require many parts 
to manufacture, as 
well as someone 
with knowledge and 
skills. 
 
Submersible: 
Torpedo 
 
A covert 
transportation torpedo 
canister which is 
towed by another 
vessel. 
 
Approx. $250 K to $500K 
USD 
 
Can travel at a depth 
of about 30 meters at 
almost the speed that 
‘towing’ vessel is 
travelling. Capable 
of carrying 2 to 5 
tons. 
 
Not able to control 
direction as they are 
unmanned. They 
rely on towing 
vessel. Reduced 
carrying capacity. 
 
Low Profile 
Vessels (LPVs) 
 
Resemble the shape of 
sealed ‘go-fast’ boats. 
Their design has 
improved, making 
them lower to the 
water surface and 
almost completely 
submergible. 
Equipped with 
navigation systems, 
anti-radar features, and 
water-cooled mufflers. 
 
Approx. $750 K to 
$1 Million USD 
 
Can carry up to 10 
tons of narcotics 
(worth around $200 
Million USD). Have 
300 hp motor. Built 
mostly from 
fiberglass. Stealthy 
design and upper 
lead shielding helps 
to minimize their 
heat signature. Carry 
a crew of five. 
 
They are not able to 
submerge fully 
under water. They 
can be detected 
from the air. 
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NARCO-VESSELS: CATEGORIES 
 
Narco-subs can be generally divided into three categories; Low Profile Vessels (LPV) / Self- 
Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS), Submersibles / Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV), and Narco 
Torpedoes (the towed variety). 
 
Below we present additional information on each of these three categories along with their own 
respective set of accompanying diagrams. 
 
Note: All diagrams presented in the immediate section below via: 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and- 
semi.html?spref=tw&m=1 [Blogger LZ]. No updates to the site for some years now. 
 
 
 
Semi-Submersibles 
 
These vessels are capable of ballasting down to lower their surface profile, and controlling their 
running depth, but not fully submerging. These are rare with only a few ever been captured. 
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Submersibles (FSVs) 
 
Type A: Submarine with self-propulsion (self-propelled) capability. This is the most advanced 
category and hence the most expensive to develop and build. Fully submersibles are very rare. 
Only a few have ever been captured. Due to sporadic evidence, it is difficult to project how many 
of this type of vessels are currently employed. Based on the detected vessels to date, there does 
not seem to be any clear evidence of successful operation of fully submersible submarines. 
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Size Progression (comparison): 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Narco-Torpedoes 
 
Type B: Towed 'Torpedo' - covert transportation canister towed by disguised vessel. 
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Low Profile Vessels (LPVs) 
 
The first low profile vessels (LPVs) boats resembled sealed ‘go-fast’ boats which simply rode 
lower in the water.  The usual arrangement of these vessels had a cabin at the rear and cargo hold 
amidships.   However, over time the LPV’s configuration has been modified resulting in a 
specialized hull form with generally pointed bow and stern, with small cabin amidships, an engine 
compartment located in the rear of the vessel, and narcotics cargo placed in every available space. 
These LPVs were designed to run awash to minimize radar cross-section. They are often 
incorrectly described as “semi-submersible”. They represent the vast majority of seized drug 
smuggling vessels to date. 
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SECTION 1: 
RAWFEED: THE EVOLUTION OF THE DRUG SUBMARINE 
 
Hannah Stone 
InSight Crime 
Originally published 8 March 2011 
 
 
Following the discovery in February of Colombia’s first fully submersible “narco-submarine,” 
built by drug cartels to ship cocaine through the Pacific to the United States via Central America 
and Mexico, the Colombian newspaper El Pais has produced a special report on the evolution of 
submersible and semi-submersible drug-trafficking vessels, whose increased use demonstrates not 
only the creativity of drug gangs in finding a way to get their products to market, but the extent of 
their resources in being able to privately construct such sophisticated devices. 
 
The emergence of the semi-submersible followed work by U.S. and Colombian authorities to 
increase maritime interdiction in the Pacific in the 1990s and 2000s, with sea patrols and radar 
tracking managing to intercept many of the speedboats or so-called “go-fast” the traffickers used. 
 
The traffickers had to come up with a new method: traveling below the surface of the water. 
Initially, as Colombian Rear Admiral Hernando Wills explains in an interview in the video 
attached below, the boats were semi-submersibles that were crudely designed like go-fast boats 
with another hull placed on top to allow them to travel just beneath the water’s surface. 
 
Wills describes the first discovery of one of these crafts, which took place in 1993 on the 
Colombian island of Providencia. The craft was “very rudimentary,” the navy officer says, with 
the capacity to carry just one ton of cocaine. 
 
Later versions sunk slightly deeper and were often constructed from fiberglass in order to make 
them hard to detect by radar. And the vessels would have a system of drainage valves to make 
them easy to scuttle if intercepted, sending the evidence to the bottom of the sea. 
 
 
The latest seizures, however, illustrate a rapid evolution in capabilities. In contrast to these early 
attempts, the submarine found in the southwest province of Cauca in February is 30 meters long 
and three meters wide, and can carry four crew members in its air-conditioned interior, which even 
features a small kitchen. Perhaps most importantly, it can carry eight tons of cocaine, dive eight 
meters underwater, and reach all the way to the coast of Mexico, with only a periscope remaining 
above the surface (see El Pais’ diagram). 
 
This was the second such privately-constructed fully-functional submarine discovered, after the 
July 2010 finding of such a craft in Ecuador close to the Colombian border. That submarine could 
go 20 meters deep, and carry 10 tons of cocaine. 
 
 
Such capacity is a game changer. A 2008 U.S. military Southern Command report predicted that semi- 
submersible vessels would soon be able carry 330 tons north each year or close to half of all cocaine 
moving north. 
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There is some evidence this may already be the case. A 2010 United Nations report on The 
Globalization of Crime said that in 2008, 46 percent of all cocaine seized by Colombia in the 
Pacific was found on semi-submersibles. With the U.S. estimating that 69 percent of cocaine 
entering the country in 2007 left Colombia via the Pacific, semi-submersibles have in the last few 
years been responsible for a very sizeable proportion of the global cocaine trade. 
 
However, the subs represent something that goes beyond their capability to carry drugs. They are 
home-made, privately built by drug traffickers in makeshift jungle workshops. The amount of 
funds needed to set about such a project is huge, with navy personnel estimating that the Cauca 
submarine likely cost more than two million dollars to build. This ability to invest and take on 
long-term, high-value projects is a warning of the traffickers’ high level of resources and 
organization. 
 
 
The increased use of submersibles and semi-submersibles is highlighted in the UN’s International 
Narcotics Control Board’s latest annual report, which says that the use of semi-submersibles for 
drug trafficking has “strongly increased” in recent years, quoting Colombian government figures 
that while 19 such vessels were seized worldwide between 1993 and 2007, 34 were seized in 2008 
and 2009 alone. 
 
 
Colombia’s territory bordering the Pacific provides the ideal environment to construct and hide a 
submarine, as much of it is wild and remote country criss-crossed with rivers and jungles. Much 
of the region is under the influence of drug trafficking organizations such as the Rastrojos, with a 
heavy presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC), particularly the rebels’ 29th Front in Nariño and 30th 
Front in Choco. 
 
 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-evolution-of-the-drug-submarine 
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SECTION 2: 
THE RISE OF THE NARCO NAVY 
 
Adam Elkus 
USNI News 
Originally published 15 June 2012 
Updated 5 February 2013 
 
Somali pirates and Iranian irregular warfare craft are well known to naval audiences, but the narco 
navy deserves equal infamy for its drug-smuggling operations in the Americas. Both crude self- 
propelled semi submersibles and full makeshift submarines are complicating drug interdiction in 
the Americas. The United States and international partners have responded with network-centric 
surveillance, tracking, and interdiction efforts, but seaborne interdiction operations are ultimately 
adjuncts to the more expansive interdiction missions conducted on the U.S.-Mexican border itself 
and the counternarcotics operations run throughout Central and Latin America by the U.S. military 
and the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
 
Since the beginning of the War on Drugs in the 1970s, the United States and its partners have sunk 
vast sums into detecting, interdicting, and deterring drug smuggling. But, as rapper Rick Ross 
observed, drug smugglers consider “being dead broke [as] the root of all evil.” The mind-boggling 
sums of money available to those who can supply product to the hemisphere’s biggest drug market 
is more than enough to convince drug lords and their agents to risk imprisonment, injury, and 
death. How much money? By 2009 estimates (the latest available), Mexican and Colombian cartels 
rake in $39 billion in wholesale drug profits annually. Depending on where you live in the U.S., a 
kilo of cocaine sells for between $34,000 to $120,000. The risks are great, but so are the potential 
rewards. 
 
The primary battlespaces in the drug war are the “plazas,” a set of heavily contested drug- 
trafficking routes in northern Mexico. Cartels spill blood and cut off heads for control of the plazas, 
but the Caribbean trafficking routes are no less important. By utilizing small craft and “narco- 
subs,” drug smugglers make it more difficult and expensive for the US to interdict them. The narco 
navy also heavily exploits capability gaps among American partners that lack American manpower 
and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. 
 
The most basic surface combatant utilized by the narco navy is the old-fashioned and dependable 
go-fast boat. Familiar to viewers of Scarface and Miami Vice, the go-fast boat is typically between 
25 and 45 feet in length and mostly travels at night. An typical go-fast boat contains one to two 
tons of Colombian cocaine and typically complete a coke run in one day. Go-fast boats are 
occasionally augmented by slower craft such as Mexican “panga” boats—small fishing boats used 
to transport marijuana from Mexico’s Pacific coast to California. 
 
But the narco navy is hardly limited to surface operations. Drug smugglers have their own silent 
service in the narco-subs. So what are narco-subs? These craft range from cheap, self-propelled 
semi-submersibles that move product over short distances to submarines with periscopes capable 
of traveling from South America to the United States. Narco-submarines have been discovered in 
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Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and other regions of the Americas. They augment the fast-boast force 
through their ability to clandestinely transport drugs and evade detection. 
 
Narco-subs, while primitive compared with advanced Western navies, are nothing to be scoffed 
at. They have long since evolved from the disposable water coffins utilized in the 1990s to 
supersubs that operate out of clandestine pens along the Colombian coastline. One narco-sub 
contained up to 10,000 pounds of cocaine and was equipped with global positioning systems. 
Another sub was 74 feet long, with twin propellers and a 5-foot conning tower. Of course, not all 
narco-subs are sophisticated, as smaller subs capable of transporting lesser loads shorter distances 
continue to be employed. 
 
How do the United States and its partners cope with narco-subs and go-fast boats? Some of the 
same principles of data fusion, collaboration, and synchronization that Norman Friedman dubbed 
“picture-centric warfare” in warfighting come into play when interdicting the narco navy. The 
United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has invested in the use of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance tools as well as nontraditional organizations like the Joint 
Interagency Task Force South that share information throughout the U.S. government. 
 
The United States has also significantly internationalized the drug war. The U.S., Canadian, 
Central American, and European joint anti-illicit trafficking campaign Operation Martillo is one 
of SOUTHCOM’s key tools for combating drug smuggling. With 14 countries participating, 
Martillo netted 119 metric tons of cocaine with a wholesale value of $2.35 billion. Because of the 
problem’s sheer scale, decisive operations against drug traffickers are only possible with 
international cooperation. 
 
Martillo, however, is only one segment in a larger American set of regional security initiatives in 
the Americas. In Mexico, cooperation against drug cartels occurs under the framework of the 
Merida Initiative. Extensive American civilian and military assistance has also resumed in a 
Central America increasingly buffeted by fierce drug-related crime and violence. Just as naval 
operations ultimately are aimed at influencing events on land, the U.S. contest with the narco navy 
augments and supports land-based operations. 
 
As long as drugs are profitable, traffickers will invest in more elaborate ways to evade the military 
and law enforcement. The presence of submarines themselves are operational responses to the 
tightening of the net around the Caribbean. This does not mean, however, that the United States 
and allies cannot raise the cost of operating with sophisticated ISR systems, intelligence-sharing, 
and collaborative and flexible organizations that ensure the right people have the information 
necessary for detection and interdiction. What it does mean is that drugs will continue to be 
smuggled—overland and at sea—by truck and by submarine. 
 
http://news.usni.org/2012/06/15/rise-narco-navy 
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SECTION 3: 
THE EVOLUTION OF ‘NARCO-SUBMARINES’ ENGINEERING 
 
 
Byron Ramirez 
Small Wars Journal 
Originally published 27 February 2014 
Updated for this paper 18 May 2014 
 
Who: Colombian drug cartels. 
 
What: The deployment of ‘narco-sub’ vessels which include submarines, semi-submersible 
(SPSSs) vessels, narco-torpedoes, and low profile vessels (LPVs) in Colombia as a tactical 
countermeasure to the increased effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and military services 
in detecting and seizing planes and go-fast boats.  These vessels provide a new means for 
transporting and delivering narcotics to their intended destinations while lowering the risk of 
detection and interdiction. 
 
When: Indications traced back to at least 1993 near the San Andres Islands, Colombia.  In that 
interdiction, the captured semi-submersible vessel was about 7 meters long and had the capacity 
to carry up to 2 tons of narcotics.  By the mid-2000s, there had been a significant increase in the 
number of semi-submersible (SPSSs) vessels and low profile vessels (LPVs) found and seized by 
Colombian and U.S. authorities.  The design of the confiscated vessels reflects an evolutionary 
engineering process. 
 
Where:  Most recently, the vessels are being manufactured near Colombia’s Pacific coastline. 
Smugglers carry building materials, including heavy equipment like propulsion gear and 
generators into jungles and then assemble the vessels under jungle canopies. Once completed, the 
vessels are moved through mangroves via muddy rivers that empty into the Pacific Ocean.  Once 
there, the vessels travel northward towards Central America and Mexico where they will transport 
and deliver narcotics. 
 
Why:  Due to the increased collaborative efforts of law enforcement agencies and militaries as 
well as their increased tracking and policing technologies which enabled them to detect drug planes 
and go-fast boats with greater effectiveness, smugglers developed ‘narco-subs’ as an innovative, 
alternate counter-measure for delivering their narcotics. These vessels have been custom-built by 
drug traffickers to smuggle their narcotics in an effort to reduce the risk of detection and seizure. 
 
Evolution:  When examining the various vessels seized to date, we can observe an evolution in 
the engineering used in these ‘narco-sub’ vessels.  The first vessel confiscated (1993) was truly a 
rough initial experimental model, built out of fiberglass and wood.  The San Andres semi- 
submersible as it came to be known was able to control its running depth and direction. However, 
this vessel was not able to fully submerge. Hence, it was visible from the air. Moreover, its speed 
was relatively low, estimated to be less than 10 mph. These attributes converged to make its 
detection highly possible. 
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During the years that followed, perhaps until near the end of 2004, the ‘narco-sub’ vessels went 
through an experimentation phase during which cartels attempted to improve design and 
performance capabilities through trial and error.  It is during this phase that we can find the 1994 
Tayrona model and the 1995 Cartagena model.  Both of these vessels were submersibles capable 
of self-propulsion and full submersion. Even though their engineering was relatively rudimentary, 
these vessels were still capable of travelling longer distances while carrying larger loads of 
narcotics. Hence, their improved design allowed them to travel slightly faster and submerge under- 
water, while having an increased carrying capacity. It is also during this experimentation phase 
that some drug smugglers contracted Russian engineers to help develop a better narco-submarine 
(see Facatativa submarine). 
 
Interestingly, between 2005 and 2006, authorities seized an increased number of similarly 
designed vessels which seems to indicate rapid consistent construction which in turn appears to 
signal a rapid prototyping phase taking place.  Since most of the seized vessels during this time 
period seem to exhibit similar design characteristics, it is possible to conceive that drug traffickers 
may have streamlined their scope of designs and focused on building certain models.  After all, 
most of the seized vessels during this period seem to resemble go fast-boats (similar hull form) 
that were reconfigured so that their profile is lower and hence they are less visible. However, 
during the narco-submarine prototyping phase, drug traffickers continued to experiment with 
numerous variations.  This includes all sorts of methods to mask the heat signature (using 
underwater heat exchangers) and even cathodic protection.  It is believed that this may have been 
necessary because they used discarded fiberglass molds to make the hulls of both Go-Fast boats 
and SPSSs.  In terms of how they accessed discarded molds, when legitimate boat manufactures 
claim to have destroyed their molds after they were used, one can only guess. It is also during this 
phase that we see the emergence of low profile vessels (LPVs). The vessels captured during 2005 
and 2006 seem to fall under the category of LPVs.  These vessels had greater stealth, better 
operational performance, and increased speed and size. 
 
It is difficult to determine whether at some point drug cartels decided to focus mainly on building 
LPVs instead of submarines and that is perhaps the reason for the increased number of LPVs that 
were detected. Nonetheless, it is most likely that drug smugglers have employed a mixed strategy 
of using both LPVs and submarines concurrently and the LPVs may have been less effective in 
avoiding detection, thus explaining why they may have been captured in greater numbers. 
 
Beginning in 2007, authorities witnessed more advanced capabilities in narco-vessels, along with 
more effective designs that seem to have become increasingly standardized.  In essence, this is a 
phase of standardization and design maturity.  Narco vessels seized after 2007 were faster, more 
stealthy, and capable of carrying bigger loads of drugs than earlier models.  During this period, a 
narco-sub was capable of reaching speeds of 11 miles per hour while carrying up to 10 tons of 
narcotics worth around $200 million USD wholesale. Moreover, some of these newer models are 
powered by a 300 / 350 horse-powered diesel engine. They also carry large fuel tanks which allow 
them to travel a range of 2,000 miles (3,200 km). Because the majority of their structure is made 
out of fiberglass material and they travel nearly below the sea surface, these vessels are almost 
impossible to detect via sonar or radar.  Colombian narco-traffickers are effective at diversifying 
their risk by never solely relying on a single method of transport.  During the standardization 
phase they continued to employ ‘go-fast’ boats and fishing boats and also began using ‘go- 
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slows’.  Rather than deploying one ‘go-fast’ carrying 2000 kg, they instead used 10 smaller ‘go- 
slows’, single engine boats each carrying 200 kg which remained in Colombian, Panamanian, and 
other territorial waters. 
 
In recent years, ‘narco-sub’ vessels (mostly LPVs) have been built with upper lead shielding which 
helps to minimize their heat signature and hence they can evade infrared sensors.  Some of the 
newer models have piping along the bottom to allow the water to cool the exhaust as the ship 
moves, making it even less susceptible to infrared detection. This suggests that enforcement 
agencies face great challenges in finding them, and thus, must detect them from the air, while 
realizing that they yield almost no wake and that their color scheme is usually adapted to where 
the boat is designed to operate from; hence, a boat from the southern Pacific coast of Colombia 
would  be  a  different  shade  than  one  operating  near  the  border  with  Panama  or  in  the 
Caribbean. Lastly, ‘narco-sub’ vessels also possess ballast tanks to alter the vessel’s buoyancy and 
are equipped with a satellite global positioning system that aids navigation. 
 
Evolutionary chart: 
 
1970s through 
early 1990s 
Go-fast boats 
 
 
 
Fiberglass material. Deep “V” offshore 
racing hull - usually 30 to 50 feet (10 to 15 
m) long, narrow in beam, and equipped with 
two or more powerful engines, often with 
more than 1000 combined horsepower. The 
boats can typically travel at speeds over 80 
knots (150 km/h) in calm waters, over 50 
knots (90 km/h) in choppy waters, and 
maintain 25 knots (47 km/h) in the average 
five to seven foot (1.5 to 2 m). 
Early 1990s 
through 2004 
‘Narco-sub’ Experimentation Phase 
 
 
 
Fiberglass and wood; low horse power 
engines; Many different designs used; 
Limited in range and capacity. 
2005 - 2006 ‘Narco-sub’ Prototyping Phase 
 
 
 
Similar vessels seized; Increased horse- 
powered engines; increased capabilities such 
as greater stealth, better operational 
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performance, and increased speed and size; 
Introduction of low-profile vessels (LPVs). 
2007 - present ‘Narco-sub’ Standardization and 
Maturity Phase 
 
 
 
Faster (up to 11 mph); Some made from steel; 
Capable of carrying bigger loads of drugs than 
earlier models; Two-diesel engines; Engines 
up to 350 hp; Upper lead shielding; Advanced 
navigation systems; GPS; Anti-radar features; 
water-cooled mufflers. 
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SECTION 4: 
NARCO-SUBMARINES: APPLYING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES TO 
DRUG SMUGGLING 
 
Byron Ramirez 
Small Wars Journal 
Originally published 8 March 2014 
Updated for this paper 18 May 2014 
 
 
 
Over the last few decades, drug smuggling from Latin America to the US has become a highly 
lucrative business.  Despite the efforts of several national and international law enforcement 
agencies to seize drugs, arrest smugglers, disrupt the operational capabilities of cartels, and 
diminish the flow of illicit drugs, drug smuggling continues.  International law enforcement 
agencies and militaries have increasingly collaborated and their efforts have yielded numerous 
littoral and ocean seizures and arrests. Nonetheless, drug smuggling activities in the Western 
hemisphere persist. 
 
In the early 1990s, as radar and communication technology held by militaries and law enforcement 
agencies improved, small planes and go-fast boats belonging to the Colombian cartels became 
more easily detectable.  As a result of the increased pressure from governments and policing 
authorities, drug smugglers had to design countermeasures and develop innovative ways to 
transport and deliver their drugs. 
 
This essay focuses on a set of highly advanced technological inventions used for transporting and 
delivering narcotics:  narco submarines, semi-submersible (SPSSs) vessels, low profile vessels 
(LPVs), and narco-torpedoes. Narco-submarines (name generally assigned to these types of 
vessels) are indeed innovative logistical tools that allow smugglers to reduce the risk of detection 
and capture.  From a cost-benefit analysis perspective, smugglers truly reap high ‘net benefits’ as 
the benefits certainly surpass the costs.  From an economic standpoint, the amount returned is a 
high multiplier of the amount invested.  And from a strategic viewpoint, drug smugglers through 
their narco submarines are able to effectively counteract militaries’ and agencies’ surveillance 
moves. Hence, drug smugglers have both economic and strategic incentives to invest in narco 
submarine technologies. 
 
In the early 1990s, Colombia’s Medellin Cartel began to consider ‘narco-subs’ as covert and 
innovative method for distributing its products.  Because the Colombian drug cartels at that time 
were vertically integrated— they controlled the various steps in the product value chain (coca 
cultivation, manufacturing, distribution, etc.,)—they well understood the economic value of being 
able to efficiently control the delivery of narcotics to their destination while lowering the risk of 
detection, interception, and apprehension. 
 
As a result, Colombian drug cartels began to allocate economic resources and invest in producing 
narco-submarines as an alternate distribution method.  Actual Russian naval engineers were 
contracted by the cartels to assist in narco-submarines’ design and construction. The apparent goal 
of drug smugglers was to develop a vessel that would be self-propelled, radar-dodging, stealthy, 
and capable of travelling long distances. 
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After the Medellin Cartel’s collapse in the early 1990s and subsequently the arrests of the Cali 
Cartel leaders, remaining lieutenants and their respective emerging drug smuggling organizations 
continued to make investments in narco-submarine technologies. 
 
Narco-Subs 
 
The first so-called ‘narco submarine’ was detected in 1993 near the San Andres Islands in 
Colombia.  However, it was not a fully-submersible vessel.  Rather, the San Andres Narco-Sub 
was a semi-submersible not capable of diving fully under water. Most of the surface vessel glided 
under water while the cockpit and exhaust tubes remained above water. It was about 7 meters long 
and had a carrying capacity of up to 2 tons and a crew of 2.  This vessel was constructed out of 
fiberglass and wood. Later, early narco-subs that were produced include the following: 
 
• The Tayrona Narco-Sub: In 1994, another vessel, named the Tayrona submarine was 
seized near Santa Marta, Colombia. This vessel was less than 10 meters long. It was made 
of wood and fiberglass and was fit for shallow submergence only with depth controlled by 
lead weights externally mounted on the lower hull.   It also possessed advanced 
communication and navigation equipment.  This first manned submersible was perhaps 
towed behind another vessel (or so it is believed by COLNAV Intel). COLNAV naval 
engineers and architects estimate that this submarine only had a range of about 200 
nm.  COLNAV Intelligence suggests that the tactic employed with this sub was to tow it 
and release it when sighted by a Navy/Coast Guard vessel, or once it was near its 
destination. 
 
• The Cartagena Narco-Sub: A year later, Colombian authorities captured an unfinished 
vessel in Cartagena, Colombia. This vessel, the Cartagena submarine, had a cylindrical 
steel hull which hints the intention of operating it at greater depths relative to the fiberglass 
vessels previously confiscated. When this vessel was found there were no ballast tanks nor 
the water inlets/outlets associated with them, which suggests that lead weights were to be 
employed similarly as with the 1994 Tayrona model.  The 1995 Cartagena submarine was 
about 11 meters long, 2 meters wide, and had a carrying capacity of about 1.5 tons. 
 
As the years transpired, the narco-sub technology seems to have improved.   As with any 
technology, iteration was probably necessary and results were not immediately evident. 
 
• The Facatativa Narco-Sub: In September 2000, law enforcement agencies in Colombia 
found a Russian-designed narco-sub in the town of Facatativa, near Bogotá.  This vessel 
was longer and wider than previous models and had a more elaborate cylindrical, stealthy 
design.   When the vessel was found it was still under construction.   Its estimated 
construction cost is 10 million USD.  The Facatativa submarine was 30 meters long and 
3.5 meters wide. This vessel was indeed intended to be a submarine, capable of full 
submersion. It was to be ‘double hulled’ with a single shrouded screw. It is estimated that 
it could have carried a crew of up to12 persons.  Had this submarine been completed, the 
double-hulled vessel may have been able to travel long distances 2,000 nautical miles 
(3,700 km), dived 330 feet (100 meters) and carried 150-200 tons of cocaine or heroin. 
 
The Facatativa vessel is significant as it had a large carrying capacity (storage space), and 
would have been able to travel long distances and dive to depths that would have made its 
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detection highly challenging. The Facatativa model would likely have had depth sonar, 
satellite communication, GPS, and navigation radar. 
 
• The Vigo Narco-Sub: Spanish Police in 2006 captured a vessel on the Atlantic coast 
which they called the Vigo vessel.  It is believed that this submarine was constructed in 
Spain and was not closely related to the Colombian subs in design terms. The vessel was 
11 meters long, 3 meters wide, and made from steel with ballast tanks on the flanks. A 
design feature worth noting is the use of separate props for the diesel (main) and electric 
drive. This vessel was likely intended to travel short distances between a cargo ship and 
shore to bring illicit drugs into Spain for distribution. 
 
• A Kevlar Coated Narco-Sub: In July 2010, Colombian and Ecuadorian authorities with 
the assistance of the United States found and seized a submarine a few miles south of the 
border between Colombia and Ecuador. This was a noteworthy find as this was a 30 meter 
long, 3 meter wide, large fiberglass submarine with diesel-electric drive and twin screws. 
The Kevlar coated submarine was designed for underwater operation while it could also 
operate in shallow submergence. The pilot windows located at the base of the sail seem 
very similar to the cockpits of other low-profile vessels. 
 
• The Timbiqui Narco-Sub: In February 2011, Colombian authorities assisted by the DEA 
(Drug Enforcement Administration) seized a 100 foot long (30 meters) submarine in 
Timbiqui, Cauca, Colombia.  The submarine lied half-submerged in a mangrove swamp. 
The vessel was a fully submersible made out of fiberglass.  It could carry a crew of 4 and 
dive down to 30 feet (9 meters) below the surface.  The submarine had the capacity to 
transport 8 tons of narcotics worth close to $150 million to $200 million USD. The 
estimated cost of building this submarine is around $2 million USD. The vessel’s design, 
two diesel engines, and sophisticated navigational equipment would have allowed it to 
travel long distances (up to 2,000 miles) at a speed of up to 11 miles per hour. 
 
Low Profile Vessels (LPVs) 
 
Since early 2006 there were an increased number of seized narco vessels, namely low profile 
vessels (LPVs). Improved detection and surveillance technology allowed authorities in Colombia 
and the United States to more easily detect, intercept, and seize drug carrying vessels. Authorities 
then realized that drug smugglers countered accordingly and produced increasingly sophisticated 
vessels, which include features such as modern electronics, navigation systems, anti-radar features, 
and water-cooled mufflers, all of which make detection more difficult. 
 
The first low profile vessels (LPVs) boats resembled sealed ‘go-faster’ boats which simply rode 
lower in the water.  The usual arrangement of these vessels had a cabin at the rear and cargo hold 
amidships.   However, over time the LPVs’ configuration has been modified resulting in a 
specialized hull form with generally pointed bow and stern, with small cabin amidships, an engine 
compartment located in the rear of the vessel, and narcotics cargo placed in every available space. 
Moreover, sloping sides to the cabin suggest radar stealth. Overall, the vessels’ stealthiness derives 
from being built largely out of fiberglass and being low in the water. 
 
In more recent model adaptations, LPVs included the capability to trim running depth via 
hydroplanes at rear, a much lower profile than most low-profile boats with the nose completely 
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submerged even in calm seas, and metal construction instead of fiberglass.  Some examples of 
LPVs include the 2006 Pital model and the 2007 Guajira model. 
 
• The 2006 Pital LPV was seized on the River Timbo near Buenaventura, Colombia.  It 
was 18 meters long and almost 4 meters wide.   It could carry 4 tons.   The 2006 Pital 
model is unique for its twin engine and twin prop arrangement. 
 
• The 2007 Guajira LPV seized 10 miles off Colombia’s Atlantic coast (near the Guajira 
Department) was 20 meters long and 3 meters wide.  It had the capacity to carry 10 tons. 
The rounded cross-section of this LPV provides much larger internal volume and load 
capability than most other low-profile boats previously constructed. The mechanical design 
of this vessel is also of a twin engine with twin props, twin screw and had large fuel tanks. 
COLNAV estimated that this vessel had a range of 3500 nm. This was the first instance of 
a LPV captured on the Caribbean coast.  The range of this particular vessel yields some 
inquiries. Why would Colombian drug traffickers need that type of range? Are Colombian 
DTOs perhaps displeased with the cut that the Mexican DTO receive and are consequently 
developing narco submarines that will allow them to bypass Mexico altogether?  Or 
perhaps are they concerned about US efforts at the southern border so they may be 
producing submarines with longer range capacity in case the U.S. makes some 
breakthrough in security. 
 
Narco-Torpedoes 
 
In August 2005, U.S. authorities seized an unmanned semi-submersible in the Pacific Ocean. This 
caught the attention of militaries and law enforcement authorities as they realized that some vessels 
were being built in the form of torpedoes, filled with narcotics, and towed underwater by another 
boat.  These were towed behind a vessel, usually a fishing boat.  These probably pre-date the first 
submarine attempts. The ‘narco torpedo’ essentially travels at a depth of about 20 to 30 meters. 
The torpedo is released if the authorities approach, and discharges beacons after a set period of 
time to allow recovery by a back-up boat after the authorities have left the area. The ‘narco- 
torpedo’ vessel represents a tactical variation in transporting narcotics.  Narco-torpedoes are 
designed to be difficult to detect and are cheaper to build than semi-submersibles. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the past 20 years, drug smugglers have experimented with the design and construction of 
submarines, semi-submersible (SPSSs) vessels, low profile vessels (LPVs), and narco-torpedoes. 
The vessels that have been seized to date reflect technological innovation as well as a commitment 
towards continuously improving the vessels’ design and operational capabilities. Drug smugglers 
have effectively employed technology as means to their specific ends. It is evident that during the 
last two decades drug smugglers have invested on advancing their ‘narco-sub’ technologies. There 
is a clear economic payoff in doing so; the cost of building one of these vessels is low relative to 
the immense levels of profit they produce, while their design and engineering help to reduce the 
overall risk of detection. It is not known how many of these narco-sub vessels are currently under 
construction and in operation. However, we can be certain that in spite of increased efforts on the 
part of militaries and law enforcement authorities to detect, intercept, and disrupt narcotics 
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distribution, drug smugglers will certainly continue to search for effective ways of transporting 
and delivering their product. 
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SECTION 5: 
TRAJECTORIES, CONTINUITIES AND DISPLACEMENTS IN THE 
BIOGRAPHY OF ‘NARCO-SUBS’: FROM THE CARIBBEAN TO THE 
PACIFIC 1993-2013. 
 
Javier Guerrero Castro 
Written 23 April 2014 
 
 
 
Drug Smuggling Organizations (DSOs) have used different approaches to submarine smuggling; 
each of those methods creates new challenges for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Some of 
those strategies employed include: divers carrying drugs to the sea boxes of ships or, cylindrical 
tubes (fiberglass or steel) firmly tied to the keel of small vessels and the popular method known as 
‘narcosubs’. Narco-subs is a definition that encompasses different semi-submersible and 
submersible artifacts used by (DSOs) to transport illicit drugs to different destinations along the 
Caribbean Sea or Pacific Coast of Central America. 
 
Narco-subs can be classified into two main categories: Semi-submersible artifacts and submersible 
artifacts. The first category, accounts for most of the narco-subs, while events of the second 
categories are scarce. The main difference between the two categories is their immersion capacity. 
A semi-submersible can submerge up to three quarters of its structure while a submersible achieves 
full immersion of its hull. Within the latter category, we have both manned and unmanned devices. 
The most common of the unmanned artifacts are also known as ‘Torpedoes’ or ‘narco-torpedoes’ 
that are cylindrical steel tubes with stabilizing fins (Fig 1.) and which are usually towed by fishing 
boats. 
 
 Fig.1 
 
Despite the important role of innovation developed by the DSOs in order to carry their activities, 
these processes have been scarcely studied. Two broad interpretations of the phenomenon can be 
found. The first often found in the media focuses on the ‘technological achievements’ of DSOs 
accompanied with a sense of wonder for such. The second is centered on the idea of ‘catching up’. 
This second interpretation only takes into account the flexibility and technological innovation 
capacities of DSOs and can be summarized in the idea that Drug Smugglers are always ‘one step 
ahead’ of LEAs. 
 
In the case of Drug Smuggling Technologies, we are in need of studies that go beyond the two 
mentioned approaches.  We must also understand the technological choices of those involved in 
the War on Drugs (WoD) along with related full implications and complexity. As Dolnik (2007, 
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p. 16) affirms “it is impossible to understand fully the tactical and technological choices of a group 
without understanding the historical, emotional and expressive meaning of a particular weapon or 
tactic to a given group.” When we understand that the adaptation of a particular technology 
necessarily involves transformations within the group that adopts it, we then will be able to explain 
other changes, including organizational ones. Also, it is necessary in order to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of the evolution of a technology to analyze the coupling of 
technology design as well as its implementation and use (Pollock & Williams, 2008). 
 
New technologies are seldom developed from scratch, but are the result of a process of gradual 
change and/or a combination of existing technologies (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999, p. 9). And 
what is more important to any study of drug smuggling innovation is that the process of 
technological choice is also based on economic decisions (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999, p. 12). 
In order to understand the process of technological innovation within the WoD we need to take 
into account the structural aspects of the environment of technologies (Rip & Kemp, 1998), 
emphasize the importance of local expertise and experience, in the form of tacit, experience based 
and local knowledge for the building of successful technological artifacts (Williams, 1997), as well 
as use a more symmetrical analysis that involves not only DSOs but LEAs innovation in a process 
of co-evolution of technology. 
 
If we wish to analyze the process of technological innovation leading to the design, building and 
use of ‘narco-subs’, we could start off by identifying some key aspects of the historical 
development of the ‘narco-subs’ while highlighting the different approaches that the concept and 
development of the artifact in both the Caribbean and the Pacific has had. At the same time, it is 
worth highlighting the main changes regarding maritime interdiction developed by Colombian 
LEAs, specially the Colombian Navy. 
 
A common thread in the accounts of the development of narco-subs is the idea of a logical 
progression, both from other forms of smuggling narcotics and in the move from semi-subs to fully 
submersible artifacts (e.g. Kraul, 2007; Lagan, 2010; Mackey, 2010), and as a history of 
continuous technological improvement (e.g. Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia, 2010; Watkins, 
2011). A closer analysis of the data reveals a far more complex story, in which different artifacts 
have been designed, built and used not following a logical progression but exploring different 
overlapping alternatives. What is found is a diversity of submersible and semi-submersible 
artifacts, which can be initially analyzed as the result of ‘micro-innovations’ in some cases, and of 
radical solutions in others. 
 
As with other illicit related topics, to reconstruct the full history of the narco-subs is a difficult 
task. Nevertheless, there are some data available that allows us to approach the phenomenon. Even 
though this approach can be criticized for taking into account only “unsuccessful criminals”, the 
opposite view is to assume that LEAs are essentially efficient. The most recent data through 2013 
indicates that 82 ‘narco-subs’ (Fig. 2) and 98.2 tons of cocaine have been seized, as well as 22 
craft shipyards1. This number encompasses semi-submersible, submersible, manned and 
unmanned artifacts. But we currently lack, and probably will always, the numbers of those narco- 
 
 
 
1   Source: Armada República de Colombia. Estadísticas 2013. Bogotá D.C. Colombia. Dirección de Operaciones 
Navales. 
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subs that sank. Most of the ‘narco-subs’ have been found in the pacific, approximately 78% (64 
artifacts), while 20% of them in the Caribbean2. 
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Fig. 2 - Number of narco-subs seized. 
 
The analysis of the data allows us to see the history of ‘narco-subs’ as being divided into three 
periods: 1.) First attempts, 1993-2000, 2.) Development and consolidation of semisubmersible 
artifacts, 2001-2009 and; 3.) Current moment, 2010-Present. Each of these periods shows different 
trajectories in design and building of narco-subs, and maybe one of the aspects that could provide 
explanations for this are the structural aspects of the environment3. 
 
While the first period in the history of ‘narco-subs’ dates back to 1993 in the Caribbean, 
specifically near the Island of San Andres, it could have started a couple of years earlier. Two 
different trajectories are found within this period, the first with ‘Laura’ the narco-sub found in San 
Andres, and the one found in Barranquilla in 1994.  With the first approach, there are changes in 
the hull of the boats, consisting mainly in covering it with fiberglass, turning them into semi- 
submersible artifacts. The second approach in the early history of narco-subs, is that builders 
started with, as a navy captain said, trying to make something really complex, that is to say, to 
build submarines, or at least fully submersible artifacts. There are two prototypes representative 
of this trajectory, first the ‘Tayrona’ (Fig. 3) and second, the ‘Cartagena’ (Fig. 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2   The ‘Facatativa’ a narco sub discovered in a town near Bogotá accounts for the missing percentage. 
3   Not just as geography but as the interaction between LEAs and DSOs in the complex environment of the War on 
Drugs. Nevertheless it is important to mention the importance of taking into account the difference in geography, 
and tidal regimes are important in the way that drug smugglers act and interdiction takes place as well. 
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Fig. 3 - The Tayrona 
 
 Fig. 4 - The Cartagena
 
 
According to naval sources of the time, while different in their design, both the ‘Tayrona’ and the 
‘Cartagena’ submarines had formal naval engineering behind them, and both possessed 
hydrodynamic designs based on blueprints. The Tayrona was said to be able to submerge up to 10 
meters below the surface, it also had a sail and ballast tanks and was powered by a truck diesel 
engine that was adapted to the vessel. The ‘Cartagena’ was said to be able to submerge up to 20mt4. 
The building of these artifacts was apparently done in workshops in urban areas, and once finished; 
they were transported to the shores by truck. The materials mainly used were steel and fiberglass. 
 
It is important to mention two important developments of LEAs during the middle of the nineties. 
The first corresponds to the development of the Colombian Navy Coast Guard, and the second the 
signing of a long term agreement between Colombia and the United States regarding maritime 
interdiction. 
 
 
 
4    http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-387160 
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While the Colombian Navy Coast Guard was officially created in 1979, it was not until 1994 when 
the first boats were purchased. The ‘Dolphins’ as they are known, are small and slow boats, 
nevertheless they provided the Colombian Coast Guard with the opportunity to acquire knowledge 
regarding interdiction and procurement of technology.  In 1998, the Colombian Coast Guard 
acquired the capacity to control to some extent, one among the principal interdiction tools used 
during the nineties, the go-fast boats. LEAs were then able to procure faster boats as well as benefit 
from the deployment of Coast Guard stations and Radar Systems5. The signing and 
implementation of the agreement between the governments of the United States of America and 
of Colombia to suppress illicit traffic by sea, entered into force on February 20, 1997, allowing 
complementing capabilities and efforts regarding interdiction. 
 
The second period can be broadly dated between the years 2000 and 2009. During this period, the 
threat of narco-subs turned from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean. During this period, it is 
possible to discern a process of micro innovations from boats to semi-submersible artifacts, but 
also a more radical approach, the building of hulls from scratch. Within the first trajectory of 
micro-innovation we can account for the enhancement of cargo capacities and hidden 
compartments, followed by the covering of the hull with fiberglass (Fig. 5). Nevertheless, this left 
builders with the unsolved problem of the trail and heat signature of the vessels. These problems 
faced by traffickers were actually used by LEAs to seize vessels using visual inspections and 
infrared technologies. Builders tried to solve the heating problem by covering the engines and 
putting them inside. Finally, builders opted to cover the entire hull with fiberglass, placing a hatch 
and trying different approaches for the exhausts, Fig. 6 is an example. 
 
 Fig. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5   There are interesting turns, learning and setbacks in the process of technological and organizational innovation 
within the Coast Guard. 
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Fig. 6 
 
The second trajectory consisted of building semi-submersible artifacts from scratch. The usual 
path begins with the building of the structure, which is made from wood, then a mixture of resins, 
catalyst and solvents is spread onto the wood structure until a waterproof, insulating, lightweight 
and durable layer is formed. After this stage, electrical wiring and engines are assembled. Unlike 
the design mentioned in the previous paragraph, this semi-submersible used a diesel engine. 
Different models of this trajectory introduced micro-innovations; hydrodynamic designs were also 
introduced which helped to improve autonomy, resistance and fuel consumption. Also, the trail 
problem was resolved by using different hydrodynamic solutions until the trail was reduced to a 
minimum. Also, different approaches to the exhaust were used (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8). Finally, 
fiberglass and wood are adopted as main building materials. 
 
 
 
 Fig. 7 
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Fig. 8 
 
Similarities between artifacts allows us to confirm that semi-submersible artifacts found in the 
Caribbean (Uraba and La Guajira) during these years were the result of the same groups of ‘narco- 
subs’ builders that built subs that operated in the Pacific6. However, there is a clear difference from 
the early years of narco-subs construction. The artifacts built from 2005 on were built in artisanal 
workshops in the middle of the jungle, but near the sea, using hard to access places, with thick 
vegetation around (usually in mangrove areas), near estuaries and kept in maximum secrecy during 
the building of the artifacts. 
 
It is also important to note that during this period, the Colombian navy developed skills in 
detecting, monitoring, interdicting and capturing these artifacts using both previous strategies used 
in capturing go-fast boats as well as developing new ones (Rodriguez Viera, 2013). 
 
During the third period, we can appreciate two trajectories, one of displacement and one of 
uncertainty. The two trajectories are: (1) the search for a fully submersible manned artefact, and 
(2) the use of different approaches to unmanned submersible artifacts. The displacement of 
knowledge (possibly embodied in builders that are capable of avoiding capture) to the Caribbean, 
as five 'narco-subs' were interdicted between 2011 and 2012. 
 
The first trajectory is exemplified in two artifacts, one seized in July 2010 in Ecuador, and the 
second one seized in February 2011. The main characteristics of these vessels are their immersion 
capacity, and the introduction of new materials such as Kevlar in the building of this new 
‘generation’ of ‘narco-subs’. One important aspect is that the knowledge required for building 
these artifacts is claimed to be expert knowledge.  This knowledge is difficult to pass on and 
therefore such a trajectory is hard to follow. The second trajectory of submersible artifacts is 
represented in the artifacts known as narco-torpedoes and the return to tubes fixed to hulls of cargo 
ships. 
 
Finally, uncertainty is hard to avoid. Are narco-subs sailing in the Pacific or in the Caribbean? The 
U.S Drug Enforcement Administration has considered that only about 20% of these artifacts are 
intercepted.  There are others, who are not as pessimistic and prefer a medium estimate. Let us 
remember that no method has disappeared. 
 
 
 
 
6    The author was able to collect data regarding the building of the semisubmersible found in La Guajira in 1997, 
which was still in construction. The people of the area assert that builder came from the Pacific; they were easily 
recognizable because they were ‘morenos’ (African American) in a zone inhabited by aborigines. 
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Final Thoughts 
 
It is clear that the process of learning within the WoD for both DSOs and LEAs is both  a process 
of “learning by trying’, making improvements and modifications to different components as to 
make them work, and ‘learning by using’, making improvements in the artefact or systems of 
artifacts implemented (Fleck, 1994, p. 638). 
 
After analyzing the 20 years of narco-subs we can see some interesting patterns, (1) the move from 
the Caribbean to the Pacific, (2) the move from complex submarine artifacts with formal 
knowledge involved (Caribbean) to more local knowledge developments, involving work with 
fiberglass easily found among fishing communities in the Pacific coast who also travel to the 
Caribbean, and (3) the search for building complex submarine artifacts. 
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POSTCRIPT  
Captain Mark F. Morris, USN 
May 2014 
When I arrived in Colombia in early 2006, the main method of transport for the narco-traffickers in 
the Caribbean was still the “Go-Fast,” a high-speed, open cockpit (and usually hand-made) boat with 
four or five outboard motors carrying 1,000 to 2,000 kilograms of cocaine.  In the Pacific, it was a 
registered, flagged fishing vessel carrying from 4,000 to 10,000 kilograms (first using the Colombian 
and later the Ecuadorian flags).  On both coast these vessels would leave Colombia for somewhere 
in Central America to discharge their cargo for land transport to and across our southern frontier. 
But something was very worrying to Colombian Navy Admirals; they repeatedly told me that their 
Naval Intelligence kept hearing rumors of submersibles or submarines.   They had seen the 
rudimentary submersibles in the early 1990s and two they had captured were on display at the 
Cartagena Naval Base. These were most probably vessels that were towed behind a mother-ship and 
only released when the mother-ship had been detected by some type of maritime patrol or near their 
final destination.  They had also seen in the Pacific and captured towed-behind torpedoes (the 
Colombian Navy used the term “artifact” rather than torpedo) designed to carry cocaine. When the 
mother-ship was detected, the towline was released and the torpedo would remain below the surface 
for several hours and then rise to be reacquired by the towing vessel to continue on their journey. 
Most amazing was the true submarine found under construction in an industrial area of Bogota in 
2000; not only amazing due to its double hull and complex ballasting system but also because Bogota 
is over 350 miles from the nearest coast and is high in the Andes at over 8,000 feet above sea level. 
But other than these few examples, the narco-trafficking submersibles only existed in these 
maddening rumors. 
 
This all changed abruptly in late 2006 when the U.S. Coast Guard captured a Self-Propelled Semi- 
Submersible (SPSS) off the coast of Costa Rica with about 3,000 kg of Colombian cocaine.  After 
that, SPSSs seemed to be everywhere.  In the most technical sense, an SPSS is not a submarine, but 
rather a Low Profile or Low Observable Vessel, but by most accounts the narco-traffickers 
themselves referred to them as “submarines” (while the crews referred to them as “coffins”).  As 
more and more were captured, the Colombian Navy and we in the U.S. Embassy saw increasing 
sophistication of capabilities and measures to prevent detection.  These included various paint 
schemes to camouflage the vessel in the water.  Below the waterline heat exchangers as well as 
venting the diesel engine exhaust below the waterline to reduce the heat signature emitted by the 
vessel. Hammering a thin layer of lead between the wooden deck and fiberglass to reduce the radar 
reflectivity of the vessel (or so we thought was the idea).  One vessel was even fitted with cathodic 
protection in the form of zinc blocks which means to someone familiar with sea-going vessels that 
this vessel was designed for long-term usage not the one-way trip of almost all narco-trafficking 
vessels.  The idea that the SPSS was only a Pacific coast method of transport was ended with the 
discovery of a large, nearly complete vessel on the Guajira Peninsula in 2008.  Even to this day, 
some Colombian Naval Officers refer to this vessel as “The Beast” due to its large size. It was almost 
70 feet long, had a very wide beam with twin engines and twin propellers; analysis by Colombian 
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Navy naval engineers and naval architects indicated that it had an unrefueled range of over 2,500 
nautical miles and an 8 ton cargo capacity. Yet the rumors of true submarines remained. 
 
If 2007 and 2008 were the years of the semi-submersible, and while the SPSS did not disappear as a 
method of transport (just as the Go-Fast had not during this time), 2009 became the year of the small 
boat.  Instead of a “Go-Fast” with 2,000 kilos of cocaine, the drug trafficking organizations sent 
hundreds of small, single-engine boats called “pangas,” each with 100 to 200 kg of cocaine built into 
the hull and framework of boat. These boats hugged the coastline remaining in territorial waters of 
the littoral states thereby avoiding U.S. and Allied naval forces stopping them. While the local Coast 
Guards or Maritime Police Forces may be able to stop one or two, the vast majority of them sailed 
past unmolested.  I used the American Football term “Flooding the Zone” as way to describe this 
within the Embassy and later to the Colombian Admiralty. And yet, in spite of all the success of this 
method, the rumors of true submarines persisted. 
 
A few days before my transfer from Colombia in 2010, the Colombian Naval Intelligence’s rumor 
of a true submarine was confirmed as fact by the capture of the first of two.  The first was found in 
Ecuador only a few miles south of their border with Colombia and a few months later, the second 
was in Colombia many miles north of the Ecuadorian border.  These submarines, built in jungle 
shipyards, showed that they had sophistication necessary for completely submerged operations. And 
though designed to run on the surface on diesel propulsion, they had the ability to submerge and run 
on battery power for several hours and while underwater would be very difficult to detect. 
 
So, how do we detect, monitor, track, and stop submersibles, semi-submersibles, and, moreover, any 
vessel trafficking illicit products?  What are the best countermeasures against a narco-trafficking 
vessel in general and specifically what are the best countermeasures against the true submersibles? 
First and foremost, detecting any vessel on the high seas is difficult at best.  With some wind and 
waves, it is nearly impossible to see a small boat or the snorkel of a submarine. Now, add in the fact 
that designers and operators are working to conceal themselves and their purpose makes the task 
only harder. American operations analysis shows that given good intelligence of a drug event and a 
patrol box of a certain length and width, a surface vessel operating alone has only a 5% probability 
of detecting (PD) that event. A surface vessel with an embarked helicopter increases the PD to 30%, 
and by adding a Maritime Patrol Aircraft to the mix, the PD goes up to 70%.  Analysis by the 
Colombian Navy shows that adding one of their submarines to the mix raises the PD to 90%. 
 
My colleagues in the DEA would say that the whole process always begins with intelligence.  This 
gives them an indication of what they call a drug trafficking event. From this intelligence they would 
ask the proper authorities to move maritime assets into place to monitor the area and detect a suspect 
vessel. Once detected, next track the vessel, and then move in the forces necessary to stop, question, 
board, and capture suspect vessels (known as the “end game”). Monitoring, detecting, and tracking 
is the first part of the problem and the “end game” is the second part of the problem. The final part 
of the problem is where the DEA and other law enforcement investigate to determine the origin of 
both the cocaine and the vessel transporting it.  With respect to the vessel, the goal was to find and 
destroy the building facility (usually a jungle boatyard) and more importantly, arrest the illicit 
vessels’ designers and builders as a way of reducing the drug trafficking organizations ability to 
produce improved vessels in the future. 
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Monitoring, detecting, and tracking can be done by surface vessels patrolling but are best done with 
properly equipped maritime patrol aircraft (MPA).  These are fixed wing aircraft with medium to 
long endurance as well as very good radar and electro-optical/infrared-optical (EO/IO)1  system. 
These aircraft should also have systems designed to detect and evaluate radio transmissions and 
receivers for the shipboard Automatic Identification System (AIS)2.  MPA are also usually fitted 
with some aerial observer windows that allows for both human observation and photography of 
suspect vessels. With queuing provided by either naval or law enforcement intelligence, the aircraft 
would launch for a patrol over an area where the suspect vessel is thought to be transiting. By flying 
planned search patterns, the crew maximizes its chance to detect the suspect vessel by radar, radio 
transmission detection, and the EO/IO system.  More often than not, the crew’s main job is to 
determine a suspect vessel amongst a myriad of other vessels. For a narco-trafficking submarine or 
SPSS this would be rather easy but for a panga or drug-carrying commercial fishing vessel this can 
be very difficult.  This is where a very high resolution EO/IO system is used to monitor the suspect 
vessel from outside what is known as the counter-detection range.  Surface vessels can also patrol 
an area being part of the monitoring, detecting, and tracking phase of the problem. As shown above, 
they are limited in their ability to monitor and detect when operating alone (a 5% PD) but when they 
have an flight deck and use an embarked helicopter they are six times more effective (a 30% PD). 
Again, adding a MPA to the problem makes detection more likely than not (a 70% PD). 
 
Once a suspect vessel is detected and is being tracked, then this vessel needs to be interrogated and 
if necessary boarded, searched, the crew arrested, and evidence seized.  This can only be done by a 
surface vessel with the capability to send a boarding party to another vessel. The interrogation is to 
determine if the vessel is a registered (e.g., under the flag of a state) or a stateless vessel.  If it is a 
registered vessel, then permission of the flagging state is needed before the vessel can be boarded.3 
If the vessel is not registered, or flying a false flag, it can be boarded without further permission. 
Once detected, often the crew of a drug carrying vessel will start dumping the illicit cargo overboard 
or purposely scuttle or fire their vessel.  In this case the job of the boarding party is to first save the 
lives of the crew of the trafficking vessel and then if time allows, recover evidence for prosecution. 
Since operating an unregistered submersible or semi-submersible is against both U.S.4 and 
Colombian5 law it is not necessary for the boarding party to risk their lives entering a sinking vessel 
in order to seize evidence of illegal drugs. 
 
There are two types of surface vessels best suited for counter-narcotics operations.  First is a high- 
speed pursuit or interceptor boat designed to outrun a “Go-Fast.”  One example is the Midnight 
Express brand boat provided to the Colombian Coast Guard with Plan Colombia funding and more 
purchased later with Colombian Navy funds.  This 39 foot long boat, at one time also used by the 
US Customs Service, has a top speed of 70 knots.  While quite successful in counter-narcotics and 
 
 
 
1   Some of which are known by the trade name “FLIR” 
2   AIS is a system mandated by the International Maritime Organization on all vessels over 300 gross tons. Some 
national authorities, such as Colombia, require it on all vessels engaged in commercial fishing in their EEZ 
without regard to size. The system provides the receiving station information about AIS-equipped vessel, 
therefore it is thought that it is less like that an AIS equipped vessel would be engaged in illicit activity. 
3   Ships engaged in piracy or slaving but not drug trafficking can are the exception under International Law 
4   See 18 U.S. Code § 2285, known as the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act. 
5   The Colombian law is very similar to U.S. with one notable exception; if the person convicted is a former member 
or employee of the Colombian Navy, then the sentence is doubled. 
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other Coast Guard-type operations such as search and rescue, they had very little endurance for 
patrolling. 
 
The other type of vessel is one suited for patrolling. This could be any sized vessel from the former 
U.S. Coast Guard 82 foot Point Class cutters transferred to the Colombians early in Plan Colombia 
to Colombia’s frigates with flight decks and an embarked naval helicopter. The former could patrol 
for three or four days, the latter for several weeks. The important factor here is the ability to stay at 
sea for more than a day and patrol beyond the visual horizon. 
 
Once a vessel of any type is seized and the crew arrested, then law enforcement investigates both the 
origin of the cocaine as well as the origin of the vessel. While a hand-made panga or Go-Fast leaves 
few clues that can lead to arrests of the designers and builders, the more sophisticated SPSS and 
especially the true submersibles, usually leave many more clues.  For example, diesel engines have 
serial numbers so that previous owners can usually be found.  In the case of a submersible and the 
pressures of water at even a few feet of depth, one cannot buy piping and values at your average 
builder’s warehouse store but rather must order high quality specialty pieces designed to resist 
greater pressures.  These items have marking that identify things like the manufacturer, date and 
place of manufacture, lot number, etc.; things that give law enforcement better ability to track the 
item to the buyer. 
 
One specific countermeasure in the case of submersibles is the tracking of potential crew members 
and designers.  Many of the panga, Go-Fast, and even SPSS crews are recruited from the coast of 
Colombia in areas where fishing is common, so there is a large pool of potential recruits with years 
of boating experience. But a submarine is different; one cannot recruit a crew from a fishing village 
and expect them to successfully operate a submarine without extensive training. One can only recruit 
an experienced submarine crew from the very small pool of former navy submariners. Seven South 
American navies have submarines and while all the subs in these navies are not the same, all have 
German-built Type-209 submarines which could provide a small pool of men who have all trained 
and qualified on the same platform.  Likewise, the pool of those who could design or supervise the 
building of a submarine is very small and are very likely to have prior navy or naval shipyard 
experience working on submarines. 
 
A final note about countermeasures; it is important for the maritime forces to remain flexible because 
the Drug Trafficking Organizations are always changing their techniques, tactics, and procedures. 
In my time in Colombia, while the narco-traffickers would develop new methods – such as the SPSS 
– they would continue to use the older, proven methods such as Go-Fasts.  We had to be careful in 
our assistance to the Colombians to avoid providing single-purpose solutions. My thought was that 
if we provided them equipment that could only be used for a single purpose, for example, maybe a 
type of sonar to detect and track a semi-submersible, it would have a little use when they shifted 
back to fishing boats or sent more loads by Go-Fast.  With the limited resources I had under Plan 
Colombia, I wanted high quality items that could be used in a variety of situations. 
 
A narco-sub, be it a semi-submersible or true submarine, represents a vast improvement over the 
other methods of transporting narcotics and other illicit cargo. They are more difficult to detect and 
track than the more traditional methods of transport and generally have greater range and cargo 
capacity. But unlike the older methods, both the semi-submersible and submarine represent a threat 
to our national security; if they can leave the coast of Colombia with 5 to 10 tons of cocaine and 
50 
 
transit with little chance of detection, they could also approach our coast undetected with 5 to 10 
tons of something more dangerous than drugs. 
 
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government. 
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PICTURE GALLERY: NARCO VESSELS 
 
Vessel No. 1 
Name: San Andres semi-submersible 
Location: San Andres Islands, Caribbean 
Date: 1993 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
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Vessel No. 2 
Name: Tayrona Submarine 
Location:  Santa Marta, Colombia 
Date: 1994 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Javier Guerrero Castro 
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Vessel No. 3 
Name: Cartagena model 
Location: Colombia 
Date: Seized 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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http://www.tamariskrtw.com/?attachment_id=1296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Vessel No. 4 
Name: Batboat 
Location: Northern Colombia 
Date: Seized between 1993 - 1995 
 
 
 
http://www.tamariskrtw.com/?attachment_id=1296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Javier Guerrero Castro 
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Vessel No. 5 
Name: Facatativa Submarine (Russian-designed) 
Location: Facatativa, Colombia 
Date: September 7, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
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http://mafiatoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Cocaine-Submarine.jpg 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/slideshow/improved-cocaine-submarines-11238696 
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Vessel No. 6 
Name: Unmanned torpedo 
Location: Pacific Ocean 
Date: August 18, 2005 
 
 
 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater 
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Vessel No. 7 
Name: Pital (Low Profile Vessel) 
Location: Near Buenaventura, Colombia 
Date: March 2006 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
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Vessel No. 8 
Name: 50-foot wood and fiberglass craft 
Location: Pacific Ocean (near Costa Rica) 
Date: November 2006 
 
 
 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15811689/#.UsZt0vRDtxw 
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Vessel No. 9 
Name: Bigfoot 1(LPV) 
Location: Pacific Ocean near Colombia 
Date: November 2006 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
  
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Vessel No. 10 
Name: Low profile vessel – 18 meters long and 3 meters wide 
Location: Colombia’s Pacific Coast 
Date: July 2007 
 
 
 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
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http://www.ryot.org/drug-traffickers-using-submarines-to-move-product/32166 
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Vessel No. 11 
Name: Low profile vessel (boat) 
Location: Colombia 
Date: 2007 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater 
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Vessel No. 12 
Name: Guajira low-profile vessel (boat) 
Location: Guajira, Colombia 
Date: 2007 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.documentingreality.com/forum/f242/drugs-submarines-9096/ 
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http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater 
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Vessel No. 13 
Name: Narco Torpedo 
Location: Near Buenaventura, Colombia 
Date: 2007 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subs- 
smuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/#/cocaine-sub-seized-torpedo_23288_600x450.jpg 
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Vessel No. 14 
Name: LPV 
Location: 75 miles off Colombia’s Pacific coast 
Date: December 31, 2007 
 
 
 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater 
 
 
 
 
 
Vessel’s crew sank the vessel upon encountering authorities. 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater 
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Vessel No. 15 
Name: Steel LPV 
Location: Colombia 
Date: February 2008 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
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Vessel No. 16 
Name: Colombian home-made LPV 
Location: Pacific Ocean (near Mexico) 
Date: July 2008 
 
 
 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/12/03/176143/colombias-narco-sub-museum-gives.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7515056.stm 
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Vessel No. 17 
Name: Bigfoot 2 (LPV) 
Location: Pacific Ocean (350 – 400 miles west of Guatemala) 
Date: September 2008 
 
 
 
http://themaritimeblog.com/us-coast-guard-and-us-navy-interdict-two-semi-submersible-vessels/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/military_photos_20080916233911.aspx 
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http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26795833/ns/world_news-americas/t/us-military-nets-second-cocaine-sub- 
week/#.UzXPafldVxy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
80 
 
Vessel No. 18 
Name: Handmade LPV with 1.6 tons of cocaine 
Location: Tumaco, Colombia 
Date: 2008 
 
 
 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subs- 
smuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/#/cocaine-sub-seized-handmade_23285_600x450.jpg 
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Vessel No. 19 
Name: Narco LPV 
Location: 150 miles northwest of the Colombia-Ecuador border 
Date: January 2009 
 
 
 
Photo: US Navy 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/new-law-harpoon/ 
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Vessel No. 20 
Name: Low Profile Vessel (Self Propelled) 
Location: Caribbean Sea 
Date: January 2009 
 
 
 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/sfl-drug-submersible-vessels-busted-off-pacifi- 
002,0,4899141.photo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-08-01/news/fl-coast-guard-drug-sub-20110801_1_vessels-first- 
narco-caribbean-waters 
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Vessel No. 21 
Name: Low Profile Vessel 
Location: Eastern Pacific off the coast of Central America 
Date: October 21, 2009 
 
 
 
http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/07/drug-subs-2-0/ 
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Vessel No. 22 
Name: Low Profile Vessel 
Location: 500 miles off Colombian Pacific coast 
Date: June 2010 
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http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124.php 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Narco-subs-of-cartels-sink-to-new-lows-in- 
1707377.php 
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Vessel No. 23 
Name: Kevlar-Coated Super-submarine 
Location: 5 miles south of Colombia-Ecuador border 
Date: July 2, 2010 
 
 
 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124/photo-1251598.php 
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http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124/photo-1251598.php 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/advances-in-narco-submarine-technology/?_r=0 
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http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124/photo-1251598.php 
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http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/07/drug-subs-2-0/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subs- 
smuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/ 
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/10/mauner_mahecha_s_drug_submarin 
es_inside_a_high_tech_south_american_narco.html 
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Vessel No. 23 
Name: Kevlar-Coated Super-submarine (Interior of vessel) 
Location: 5 miles south of Colombia-Ecuador border 
Date: July 2, 2010 
 
 
 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/ 
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/ 
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff  drugsub/alV 
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/ 
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff  drugsub/all/ 
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/07/drug-subs-2-0/drug-sub-interior-dea/ 
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Vessel No. 24 
Name: LPV 
Location: 335 miles off Costa Rica (Pacific Ocean) 
Date: January 20, 2011 
 
 
 
The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Midgett and its crew of 160, based in Seattle, intercepted the vessel 
335 miles off Costa Rica (in the Pacific Ocean).  The vessel was carrying 6.6 tons of cocaine. 
 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2015001894_narcosub09m.html 
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Vessel No. 25 
Name: 100 Foot Long Submarine 
Location: Timbiqui, Cauca, Colombia 
Date: February 2011 
 
 
 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/13/the-drug-war-at-sea-rise-of-the-narco-subs.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://boingboing.net/2011/02/14/100-ft-long-drug-smu.html 
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http://boingboing.net/2011/02/14/100-ft-long-drug-smu.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://humanmindblower.wordpress.com/2011/02/19/colombian-narcotics/ 
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http://boingboing.net/2011/02/14/100-ft-long-drug-smu.html 
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http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?192796-Colombian-Armed-Forces-pics-videos- 
and-more/page143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?192796-Colombian-Armed-Forces-pics-videos- 
and-more/page143 
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http://www.sandiegored.com/noticias/5972/VIDEO-Advanced-narco-sub-seized-in-Colombia/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2061934,00.html 
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
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Vessel No. 26 
Name: Low Profile Vessel 
Location: Eastern Pacific Ocean 
Date: April 2011 
 
 
 
http://defensetech.org/2011/04/20/another-drug-sub-is-caught-at-sea/ 
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Vessel No. 27 
Name: Low Profile Vessel 
Location: Near Buenaventura, Colombia 
Date: September 2011 
 
 
 
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/27/two-new-narco-subs-found-in-colombia/ 
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http://rastreadordenoticias.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/submarino-farc.jpg 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2041685/That-sinking-feeling-Colombian-drug-cartels-latest- 
weapon-captured--submarine-maiden-voyage.html 
109 
 
 
 
 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15051108 
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Vessel No. 28 
Name: Low Profile Vessel (Interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard) 
Location: Western Caribbean 
Date: September 17, 2011 
 
 
 
A crew member aboard a LPV surrenders after the craft was stopped by the U.S. Coast Guard 
cutter Mohawk. The sub, already sinking after crew members scuttled it, had a cargo of cocaine 
aboard. 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/09/28/coast-guard-stops-another-drug-sub-in-caribbean/ 
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Vessel No. 29 
Name: Low Profile Vessel (Interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard) 
Location: Western Caribbean Sea 
Date: September 30, 2011 
 
 
 
The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Mohawk interdicted the LPV in the Western Caribbean Sea 
on Sept. 30, 2011, before its crew sank the vessel. Above is the photo of the sunken LPV. 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/10/28/coast-guard-recovers-7-tons-of-cocaine-from-drug-sub/ 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. authorities proceeded to recover 7 tons of cocaine from the sunken vessel. 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/10/28/coast-guard-recovers-7-tons-of-cocaine-from-drug-sub/ 
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Vessel No. 30 
Name: Fully functional narco-submarine (“Snorkel” sub) 
Location: Western Colombia 
Date: 2011 
 
 
 
http://www.ryot.org/drug-traffickers-using-submarines-to-move-product/32166 
 
 
 
 
 
http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel/galleries/narco-sub-mystery/at/blue-submarine-726492/ 
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Vessel No. 31 
Name: Unmanned Torpedo (7.5 meters long and 1.5 meters wide) 
Location: 65 Km south of Buenaventura, Colombia 
Date: May 2012 
 
 
 
http://www.infobae.com/2012/05/29/1051363-colombia-hallaron-otro-submarino-narco 
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Vessel No. 32 
Name: Low Profile vessel (15 meters long and 3 meters wide) 
Location: 60 miles from Rio Naya, Colombia 
Date: January 2013 
 
 
 
http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/narco-blog-narco-sub-with-crew-of- 
4-captured-by-colombian-navy/20969/ 
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Vessel No. 33 
Name: Submarine 
Location: Near Ecuador – Colombia border 
Date: October 2013 
 
 
 
http://infosurhoy.com/en_GB/articles/saii/features/main/2013/10/23/feature-02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2013/10/31/cooperacion- 
ecuador-colombia 
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http://www.cuencahighlife.com/post/2014/03/02/Cocaine-blues-Although-it-produces-almost-none-of-its- 
own-Ecuador-has-become-stopover-point-in-drug-trade.aspx 
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Miscellaneous photographs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel/galleries/narco-sub-mystery/at/underwater-drug-vessel- 
726491/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subs- 
smuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/#/cocaine-sub-seized-captains-wheel_23282_600x450.jpg 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/06/29/vbs.colombian.narcosubs/ 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.ryot.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/WORLD_NEWS_DRUGS-SUBS_1_MI.jpg 
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http://natgeotv.com/ca/inside-cocaine-submarines/galleries/drug-subs 
 
 
 
 
 
http://sundodgers.com/2013/01/17/columbia-uses-submarines-to-smuggle-drugs/ 
131 
 
 
 
http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
 
 
 
 
 
http://natgeotv.com/ca/inside-cocaine-submarines/galleries/drug-subs#8642 
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http://natgeotv.com/ca/inside-cocaine-submarines/galleries/drug-subs#8643 
 
 
 
 
 
http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
 
 
 
 
 
http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/world/americas/drug-smugglers-pose-underwater-challenge-in- 
caribbean.html?_r=0 
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Photo of the hold area of a submersible - near the bow of the vessel where the cocaine is stored. 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18707501 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18707501 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris 
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http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/slideshow/improved-cocaine-submarines-11238696 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/slideshow/improved-cocaine-submarines-11238696 
139 
 
 
 
Narco-sub clandestine construction facility in Puerto Escondido, Cordoba, Colombia 
http://m.semana.com/nacion/galeria/narcosubmarinos-historia-contada-fotos/328992 
 
 
 
Name:  PLUTO (U.S. Department Homeland Security) - Training submarine 
Location:  United States (East and West coasts) 
Date:  2008 thru present 
 
 
 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/09/120910112529.htm 
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MAP OF INTERDICTIONS 
 
 
 
 
This map shows the location where our 33 identified vessels, listed in our picture gallery, were 
interdicted between 1993 and 2013. 
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NARCO-VESSELS’ INTERDICTIONS OVER TIME 
 
Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker 
 
Type 
Year 
Semi-Submersible Submersible LPVs 
1993 (1) San Andres, COL   
1994  (2) Santa Marta, COL  
1995  (3) Cartagena, COL (4) Northern Colombia 
1996    
1997    
1998    
1999    
2000  (5) Facatativa, COL  
2001    
2002    
2003    
2004    
2005  (6) Pacific Ocean  
2006   (7) Buenaventura, COL 
(8) Pacific Ocean (near 
Costa Rica) 
(9) Pacific Ocean near 
Colombia 
2007  (13) Buenaventura, COL (10) Colombia’s Pacific 
Coast 
(11) Colombia 
(12) Guajira, COL 
2008   (14) Colombia’s Pacific 
Coast 
(15) Colombia 
(16) Pacific Ocean (near 
Mexico) 
(17) Pacific Ocean (near 
Guatemala) 
(18) Tumaco, COL 
142 
 
 
Type 
Year 
Semi-Submersible Submersible LPVs 
2009   (19) Pacific Ocean (near 
Colombia-Ecuador 
border) 
(20) Caribbean Sea 
(21) Eastern Pacific off 
the coast of 
Central America 
2010  (23) Colombia-Ecuador 
border 
(22) Pacific coast (near 
Colombia) 
2011  (25) Cauca, COL 
(30) Western Colombia 
(24) Near Costa Rica 
(Pacific Ocean) 
(26)Eastern Pacific 
Ocean 
(27) Buenaventura, COL 
(28) Western Caribbean 
(29) Western Caribbean 
Sea 
2012  (31) Buenaventura, COL  
2013  (33) Near Colombia- 
Ecuador border 
(32) Southwestern 
Colombia 
Total 1 10 22 
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 Introduction 
 
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and other distinguished Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. Illicit trafficking 
poses a serious threat to our national security, presenting a formidable challenge not only for the 
United States but for our international partners as well. Our borders are being assailed by a 
dangerous adversary that is well-resourced, adaptive, and experienced at exploiting all avenues of 
approach to the United States. These transnational criminal networks employ all modes and means 
of conveyance across all transportation domains to reach U.S. and global markets. The challenge 
is daunting. 
 
Illicit trafficking threatens our country at every land, air, and sea border and challenges the 
sovereignty of our many international partners. In particular, the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures employed by drug traffickers are methodologies that can be used by anyone wanting 
to move illicit people and/or cargo – including terrorists. The established routes, proven methods 
of conveyances, built-in logistics, communications, and command and control networks could be 
leveraged by a variety of groups seeking to do harm to the United States. While this potential 
exists, to date, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) and U.S. Southern Command 
have not seen any indication of terrorist organizations or their affiliates using illicit trafficking 
networks to reach the United States to commit acts of terrorism. We continue to monitor this 
possibility closely. 
 
JIATF-South has broad legal authorities to conduct detection and monitoring operations against 
illicit trafficking in order to hand off targets to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. The 
highest priorities are nationally nominated targets of interest, from weapons of mass destruction 
to special interest aliens and high value targets. The next tier down comprises a broad spectrum of 
transnational threats, to include the cocaine trade that by itself is worth an estimated $85 billion 
globally1. Staggering amounts of revenue and profit allow transnational criminal organizations 
(TCOs) to challenge nations by exacerbating corruption and undermining governance, rule of law, 
judicial systems, free press, democratic institution-building, and transparency, as indicated in the 
2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC)2. Cocaine is still one of the 
most lucrative forms of profit for TCOs and is produced in marketable volumes and quality in 
three countries in South America: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia3 Peru and Bolivia have the potential 
to produce 41 percent and 25 percent of the total cocaine volume respectively, and Colombia 
potentially produces 34 percent4. According to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), of the 
United States drug seizures subjected to forensic analysis, 97 percent comes from Colombia5, and 
it is this specific flow that threatens Central America, Mexico, and the United States. 
 
With a homicide rate of 82 per 100,0006, Honduras is the most dangerous country in the world, 
including the current zones of conflict in the Middle East. San Pedro Sula, Honduras has a 
 
 
1   UNODC World Drug Report 2011. 
2   The White House. President Obama’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. 
3   2010 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement. 
4   2010 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement. Potential production is assessed by arable hectares available for coca 
growth. 
5   DEA. Analysis of Cocaine Price and Quality. 
6   UNODC 2011 Homicide Rates by Country. 
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homicide rate of 159 deaths per 100,000 citizens, surpassing Ciudad Juarez, Mexico as the world’s 
most violent city7. Violent TCOs and gang activity, supported by the flow of cocaine and other 
contraband towards the United States and the rest of the global market, are negatively impacting 
citizen security. As illicit drugs move outward to the consuming markets, the money from illicit 
drug transactions returns to the source and transit regions, creating instability within our partner 
countries by promoting corruption and undermining legitimate financial institutions. My statutory 
focus as Director of JIATF-South is combating the illicit drug trade by detecting the flow of drugs 
early in the supply chain and facilitating interdiction as far from our borders as possible, before 
illicit drugs are broken down into small, harder-to-detect load sizes. Operation MARTILLO is the 
focusing lens of a whole-of-government, international solution to this significant regional threat to 
national security. Coordinated by JIATF-South to support the President’s CTOC strategy, 
Operation MARTILLO seeks to deny the use of the Central American littorals by TCOs while 
maximizing the drug interdiction efforts of our interagency partners in the principal geographic 
corridor through which the bulk of illicit drugs moves toward the United States. 
 
Drug Movement in the Transit Zone: Go-Fasts, Semi-Submersibles and Fully Submersibles 
 
JIATF-South challenges drug traffickers in the air and on the sea 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 
in defense of America’s borders. We are relentless and committed while operating in a resource- 
constrained environment. Our goal is to put drug traffickers at risk of interdiction and arrest at 
each and every step of their journey. We work very hard in constant support of law enforcement 
to ensure this all occurs seamlessly with the most effective use of our resources. Through better 
intelligence, technological innovations, and unprecedented interagency and international 
partnerships, JIATF-South has supported record cocaine disruptions, totaling 1,997 metric tons 
over the last ten years8. 
 
From all indications, eighty percent of cocaine, bound for the United States, transits initially via 
maritime methods of conveyance, while the remaining 20percent makes its first moves by air9. 
Today, Honduras is the primary initial arrival point for cocaine as it leaves the source zone; in 
2011, approximate 35 percent of the world’s cocaine supply made its first landfall there10. Once 
on land, larger loads are eventually broken down into smaller packages before entering the United 
States. The Mexico/Central American corridor, which includes the waters of the Eastern Pacific 
and Western Caribbean, is the primary threat vector toward the United States, accounting for more 
than 90 percent of total documented cocaine movement11. 
 
Cocaine from the source zone moves by a number of conveyances, the primary being go-fasts, 
usually open hulled boats anywhere from 20 to 50 feet in length with one to four powerful outboard 
engines. Carrying anywhere from 300 kilograms to 3.5 metric tons of cocaine, these vessels 
typically leave Colombia and follow the Western Caribbean coastline of Central America to make 
landfall, principally in Honduras. In the Eastern Pacific, the same types of vessels will leave 
 
 
 
7   Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad, Justicia y Paz Penal A.C. (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice), 
Mexico, 2011. 
8   JIATF-South analysis of Interagency Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB). 
9   JISTF-South case analysis. 
10 JIATF-South analysis of Interagency Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB). 
11 JIATF-South analysis of Interagency Consolidated Counter-Drug Database (CCDB). 
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Colombia or Ecuador, and transit off-shore to Guatemala and Mexico or follow the coastline to 
Panama or Costa Rica. 
 
In 2011, the interagency’s Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB) indicated that there were 
568 go-fast events moving 490 metric tons of cocaine from South America toward the  United 
States. Ninety-four percent of those movements were along the Central American isthmus into 
Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico12. This massive volume moving off-shore and often through the 
countries of Central America is contributing to the instability and corruption seen in northern 
Central America, Mexico, and along our Southwest Border. 
 
Though not present in the same numbers as go-fasts, the Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS) 
and Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV) are potentially an even more insidious threat to the security 
of the United States for two reasons: (1) their large, up to 10-ton payload capacity and (2) the 
extraordinary difficulty of detecting these vessels at sea. This makes them a dangerous drug 
conveyance that could potentially be adapted for transporting other more serious security threats 
to the United States13. 
 
The SPSS is typically constructed in undergoverned spaces, often in the sparsely populated 
mangrove estuaries of Western Colombia and Ecuador. Costing less than a million dollars apiece 
to construct, they can move enough cocaine in a single trip to generate more than $100 million in 
illicit proceeds for the traffickers14. JIATF-South detected an SPSS at sea for the first time in 2006. 
By 2009, the interagency detected as many as 60 SPSS events were moving as much as 330 metric 
tons per year. Prior to 2011, SPSS had only been employed by traffickers in the Eastern Pacific. 
However, since July 2011, JIATF-South has supported the disruption of five SPSS vessels in the 
Western Caribbean, each carrying more than 6.5 metric tons of cocaine. 
 
There have been a total of 214 documented SPSS events, but only 45 were disrupted due largely 
to the difficulty of detecting such low-profile vessels15. The Congress, deserves a note of thanks 
for its foresight and wisdom in enacting 18 USC § 2285, the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction 
Act of 2008, which made the mere operation of these stateless vessels in international waters a 
crime. This has greatly helped interdiction efforts because it eliminated the necessity for law 
enforcement authorities to recover contraband in order to affect successful arrests and 
prosecutions. 
 
The SPSS was an evolutionary step in the creation of a covert capability to transport multi-ton 
loads of contraband without any logistical support or refueling. This capability is now present in 
the FSV. These vessels can get underway from the source region, fully loaded with up to 10 metric 
tons of cocaine and a crew of four, and travel up to 6,800 nautical miles unsupported16. Though 
there is currently no intelligence of shipments directly to the United States, this is a range capacity 
that can take an FSV from the west coast of Colombia to the coast near Los Angeles, or from the 
north coast of Colombia to Galveston. Unlike the SPSS, the FSV power plants are typically 
complex diesel-electric systems that allow them to operate submerged by day on battery power 
 
 
12   Interagency Consolidated Counter-Drug Database (CCDB). 
13   Office of Naval Intelligence, Assessments of seized SPSS and FSVs. 
14   JIATF-South and Office of Naval Intelligence assessment of seized SPSS. 
15   Interagency CCDB 
16   Office of Naval Intelligence, Assessments of seized FSVs. 
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and to run on the surface at night while recharging their batteries. As complex and sophisticated 
as they may appear, FSVs are constructed in the same undergoverned locations as SPSSs. These 
areas are very difficult for law enforcement or even military forces to reach. However, three FSVs 
have been seized in remote jungle areas, the first in Ecuador in 2010, and the last two in Colombia. 
Each of these three vessels was unique in its construction and had cargo capacities of over seven 
metric tons. In 2011, the Interagency documented three FSV movements, none of which were 
successfully interdicted17. 
 
Operation MARTILLO: Supporting Regional Stability/National Security 
 
Record interdiction years in the mid-2000s caused TCOs to react and mitigate their risk in several 
ways. SPSSs and FSVs were developed and their operations refined. Go-fast load sizes were 
reduced while the number of events increased significantly. Most alarmingly, TCO operations at 
sea were moved from deep water, where technological advantages favored U.S. interdiction forces, 
to the Central American littorals18. 
 
This operational migration toward the Central American isthmus created an increasingly difficult 
and destabilizing situation whereby primary drug movements from the source zone made landfall 
earlier, often in countries incapable of stopping them. Operating in and around the territorial waters 
of Central America made international cooperation and bi-lateral agreements all the more critical 
to our success. 
 
To counter this shift in flow and to alleviate pressure on Central American countries, Operation 
MARTILLO began in earnest on 15 January 2012. It is one component of a U.S. whole-of- 
government approach to counter the spread of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) in Central 
America. By demonstrating a consistent presence in the littorals of Central America, the United 
States, and our international partners seek to force TOC networks to move their transshipment 
routes to deeper waters in the Pacific and Caribbean. Operation MARTILLO demonstrates a clear 
commitment on the part of Western Hemisphere nations and other allies to work together to combat 
the spread of TCOs, and to protect their citizens from the violence, harm and exploitation wrought 
by TCO networks. Operation MARTILLO created a framework whereby complementary 
operations by partner nations and other U. S. government agencies could increase the effectiveness 
and synergy against TCOs in a difficult budget and operating environment. 
 
Since 15 January, JIATF-South has documented significant decreases in the flow of illicit drugs 
in the Central American corridor (see graphic above). Compared to the same period in 2011, the 
JIATF South documented flow of illicit drugs in the Central American corridor dropped by 46 
metric tons. While cocaine flow is down in most of the region, we did note a significant increase 
in activity in the Eastern Pacific littorals which we attribute to increased awareness of tracks 
brought by enhanced focus of our interagency and international partners in the region19. Our law 
enforcement partners are expending great effort to provide actionable information to support the 
operation. This translates to a significantly increased awareness of the movement of cocaine over 
previous years. 
 
 
17   Interagency CCDB. 
18   2010 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement. 
19   JIATF-South analysis of CCDB and JIATF-South case analysis. 
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The overall significant decrease in movement indicates an impact on the traffickers caused by the 
presence of U.S. ships and aircraft, the efforts of our law enforcement partners and those of our 
allies and partner nations in the region. Further illustrating the commitment of our hemispheric 
partners, I note that partner nations have participated in 83 percent of disrupted events, acting as a 
force multiplier and playing an enormous role in the success of the operation. Though we have not 
yet seen the traffickers shift to another region in the Joint Operating Area, we assess that a 
continued persistent presence over time will force them to change their tactics and we are prepared 
to respond to that shift when the time comes. 
 
Closing 
 
Our target set spans the full spectrum of national and international security, presenting a 
formidable transnational challenge for U.S. and allied nations. We fight a highly mobile, 
disciplined, and well-funded adversary that threatens democratic governments, terrorizes 
populations, impedes economic development, and creates regional instability. The mission to 
counter transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking cannot be viewed in isolation from our 
efforts to combat terrorism, because the patterns, tactics, and techniques employed by traffickers 
are the same as the methodologies used by anyone wanting to move illicit people or cargo - 
including terrorists. 
 
Our operational successes indicate an increasing level of trafficker sophistication and innovation 
as they rapidly employ readily available cutting edge technologies, change their tactics, and shift 
seamlessly between modes of communication and methods of conveyance. Our success is 
dependent upon our collective capability to be more innovative, more adaptive, and more agile 
than our adversaries. Currently, we are unable to target 74 percent of high confidence events. Of 
the 26 percent that we are able to target the principle impediment to successful detection and 
monitoring is the lack of the necessary sensors to generate persistent wide area surveillance and 
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precision geolocation. In spite of our challenges, we continue to be successful for two primary 
reasons. First, JIATF-South is a dynamic and evolutionary organization, one continuously 
adapting itself to evolving target sets. Second, the national and international unity of effort found 
within our command spans geographical and functional boundaries, bringing with it operational 
efficiencies and critical capabilities. 
 
I close by once again thanking the Congress for its steadfast support of our men and women in 
uniform, who work every day to keep our nation safe and I look forward to our continued 
collaboration to counter transnational organized crime and the illicit traffic that supports it. 
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF AREA WHERE NARCO SUBMARINES ARE 
BUILT IN COLOMBIA 
 
 
 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/war-for-cocaine-corridors-consumes-colombias- 
busiest-port 
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APPENDIX C: MAP OF MOVEMENT OF COCAINE INTO THE U.S. 
 
 
 
 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM11/20130226/100300/HHRG-113-HM11-Wstate-LeeW- 
20130226.pdf 
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